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PREFACE
In December 1953 diiritig the closing
lectures in a first course
in Statistical Mechanics conducted by
Dr. M. S. Watanabe of the
Department of Physics, U. S. Naval Postgraduate
School, a brief
acquaintance was made vdth -Information" in
connection with entropjr.
The possibility of relating, in a more
definite fashion, a rudi-
mentary appreciation of the fundamental
significance of entropy with
another study of extensive application
^ the transfer or recovery
of "intelligence-bearing" symbols or signals
- was intriguing.
Early in this year, fortified with the
expression A log B and the
encouragement of Dr. Watanabe the authors set
forth into the realms
of the rapidly-developing Information
Theory, lliis paper presents
a few of the landmarks and boundaries
encountered in this broad
field where the underlying unity is sometimes
obscured by the diver-
sity of application.
The authors wish to express their appreciation
to Dr. M. S.
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The entropy concept Is discussed with reference to statistical
mechanics and thermodynamics. After a demonstration by examples
of the fundamental principles of the Communication branch of
Information Theory, "information" and "entropy" are compared as
to mathematical form and as to fundamental relationship. Various
viewpoints on scientific measurement are set forth to suggest the
similarity between a measurement system and a communication system.
A theory of scientific information is briefly considered, and the
features of a measurement system are referred to related aspects
of a communication system. Entropy is discussed again as it pertains
to measurement; it is seen that the necessity for measurement prevents
Maxwell ' s demon from violating the second principle for the model
assumed. The violation would require the procurement of "free"






In considering the behavior of physical systems, it is important
to be able to maintain a balance sheet of the various energy trans-
formations which occur in natural processes. This accounting, however,
gives little indication as to the type and extent of energy conversions
which may be realized in practice. Such limitations are given expres-
sion in the second principle of thermodynamics; they are not inherent
in the first principle. From empirical and mathematical-model view-
jXDints, a measure of the tendency to proceed exhibited by a physical
system when it is free to change, has been formulated in the entropy
concept.
In addition to its engineering significance, entropy is an
important concept in modern communication theory and in Scientific
Information Theory. Since appreciation of the interplay of the
engineer or the scientific observer with the system under investi-
gation is enhanced by an understanding of the nature of entropy,
developments of the latter concept will now be considered. Essential
to this discussion of the entropy function are terms delimited as
follows
:
(a) A body whose properties have specified values is said to
be in a certain state , and the variables which are




(b) The term system , as used in thermodynamics, refers to a
definite quantity of matter bounded by some closed
surface
.
(c) A system can exchange energy with its surroundings by
the performance of mechanical work or by a "flow of heat."
If conditions are such that no energy interchange can take
place, the system is said to be isolated .
(d) When an isolated system is left to itself and the para-
meters of state are measured at various points throughout
the system, it is observed that although these quantities
may initially change with time, the rates of change become
smaller and smaller until eventually no further observable
(observable with the instruments and scale of measurement
employed) change occurs. This final steady state of an
isolated system is called a state of thermodynamic
equilibrium
.
(e) A process is any event in a thermodynamic system in which
a redistribution or transformation of energy occurs and is
evidenced by a change in the thermodynamic coordinates of
the system,
(f) A reversible process is one that may be described by a
succession of equilibrium states, or states that depart
only Inflniteslmally from equilibrium. In order for a
process to be reversible, It is essential that it be
possible to return the immediate system and emy others
associated with it from their last to their initial state
3

in exactly inverse order, and that it be possible to return
from final to original form, location, and amount all the
energy which was transformed during the process,
(g) An irreversible process is one that does not meet the
specification for reversibility. On the thermodynamic
scale all known natural processes are irreversible. The
full requirement of irreversibility is, that it is impossible,
even with the assistance of all agents in nature, to restore
the exact initial state everywhere in the system once the
process has taken place. The. definition of irreversibility
implied above in no manner demands that ^his phenomena
extend to all scales of investigation. This point will be
considered at length subsequently. However, it is interest-
ing to note here, that friction, which is an Important con-
tributor to irreversibility, is not required in the systematic
description and explanation of phenomena on the astronomical
or the atomic scales of investigation.
2, Thermodynamics and Entropy
According to Planck, (39) the only clear way of showing the
significance of the second principle is to base it on facts by
formulating propositions which may be proved or disproved by experi-
ment. Listed below are a few of those propositions:
1. It is in no way possible to completely reverse any
process in which heat has been produced by friction.
2. It is in no way possible to completely reverse any
process in which a gas expands without performing

work or absorbing heat.
3. If there is heat conduction between two bodies at
different temperature, It is in no way possible to
convey this heat back without leaving any change
whatsoever.
4.. It is in no way possible to reverse the process of
diffusion. (Essentially the same as 2)
Upon the introduction of the tenr "reverse" in the above pro-
positions, we are met with the concept of irreversibility. The
full requirement of irreversibility is, that it is Impossible,
even with the assistance of all agents in nature, to restore every-
where the exact initial state when the process once takes place.
Upon the above propositions rest the whole structure of the second
law of thermodynamics. If any one of them could be found to be
actually reversible within the confines of the afore-stated defini-
tion, then, because of their interrelation, all of them would be
capable of being reversed. Since they all represent actual observable
processes in nature, then were they reversible, the second principle
would be untrue.
The next step in consideration of the second principle is the
realization that it furnishes a relation between the quantities
connected with initial and final stages of ajiy natural cyclic process.
In reversible cyclic change, the initial and final states are identical;
whereas in irreversible cyclic processes, there is some difference
between states as pointed out by the second principle. Then from the
mathematical viewpoint, the distinction between initial and final
5

states consists of an inequality.
With this thought in mind, we turn to the mathematical inequality
developed by Clausius on an empirical basis:
^ i9. < Q. (1.0)
Applying this relation to a cyclic process, all portions of






Through further employment of this relation, this time to a
cycle, part of which is irreversible, it may be determined that the
change in entropy for an isolated system left to itself is always
positive. This determination is accomplished as follows:
Consider an isolated thermodynamic system in equilibrium
in state 1, As a result of a natural (and hence irreversible)
process, the system moves from equilibrium state 1 to
equilibrium state 2. By means of a reversible process,
the system is then returned to state 1, Taken together,
the two processes constitute a cycle which as a whole is
irreversible.
From the Clausius inequality.
/4^<o,
or writing the integral as the sum of two integrals.

+ f'^'Q < o.
(1.11)
Since the system was isolated during the change from state 1
to state 2, no heat could enter or leave the system. Hence,
J -r— — ^' (1.12)
t «
However, in order to return to state 1 and complete the cycle,
the exchange of heat and work with elements outside the system
must take place. Since this is a .reversible process,
/'i;2-s,-^..
-T- . - (1.13)
From Inequality 1.11,
S]^ - S2 < or S2 - S]^ > 0.
3. Statistical Mechanics and Entropy
Before applying probability procedures, we must first discover
how well thermodynamic systems lend themselves to an approach of this
type. There are important properties of matter which can not be
derived from gross thermodynamic considerations alone. We can go
beyond these limitations only by making hjrpotheses regarding the
nature of matter, and by far the most fruitful of such hypotheses
is that matter is composed of discrete particles. For simplicity,
the discussion that follows will be limited to an ideal raonatomic
gas, specifically to a finite volume containing a large number of
independently acting mass points in continual motion. Based on the
propjosed system at hand, we are immediately aware of the limitations
7

of the observer who cannot deal with individual units of the system,
but rather, only with measurable data such as density, volume, and
temperature. He will be refeiTed to as the macro-observer. Let us
hypothecate a super observer who can see every molecule and relate
their individual positions in space and velocity; he then is the
micro-observer. The latter has the mechanical idea of state, the
former the statistical average idea of state. The correlation, then,
between the mechanical and statistical approaches to thermodynamic
systems stems from the fact that a given macro idea of state be
characterized by many different "mechanical" ideas of state. Because
the macro-observer has only measurable data on which to base his
calculations, because this measurable data depends upon the particular
macro-state of the system, and finally due to the fact that any given
macro-state can be characterized by many possible micro-states, we
here find adequate basis for the usefulness of probability theory as
the means of description of the given system. It must be understood
that due to the chaotic movement of the molecules of the gaseous
system, all a priori possible micro-states are not realized in nature,
Z Klein 30 ]
If different portions of the system were at varying macro-states,
then the system would be described as being in molar order. If,
however, the entire system has the same macro-state, then we consider
the system as being in a state of molar disorder. We can consider moleir
disorder as being synonomous with settled, and molar order as being
synonomous with unsettled. A simple analogy is that of a swimming pool
being filled at one end with water much colder than that in the pool.
8

That end originally vrill be cooler than other portions, hence the
entire pool might be considered as being in an unsettled or more
ordered state. Given time, with no interference from the outside,
all portions of the pool will reach the same temperature. At this
stage the pool is in a settled or less ordered state. Here, by-
Nature's own process, we have a transformation from order to dis-
order, unsettled to settled, and reach thermal equilibrium throughout.
It is found that the number of micro-states is smaller for the
unsettled than the settled state, thus indicating a trend toward a
greater number of micro-states. Considering each micro-state as a
complexion, we can define the probability W of a state as the number
of complexions in that state.
A more specific description of this natural tendency to attain
a more probable state may be achieved by a consideration of the "H"
function of statistical mechanics. Boltzmann's H-theorem which
demonstrates the actual tendency for the molecules of a system to
approach their equilibriiam or most probable state employs a function
[[ Tolman 4-9 ]]
H - I) ^l '^9e^i "' Cor^st^int., (1.2)
i
where n^ is the number of molecules in the different cells in
coordinate momenta space.
This expression may be written as





where log. P, as derived from Maxwell Boltzmann's Statistics, may be
expressed by
loq^P^^ n log/^ ~ En.Jog^n^ -^ C. a. u)
Boltzmann's H-Theorem states that H decrease algebraically toward its
minimum possible value as the system approaches the condition of
equilibrium,
A generalized form of the H -theorem was developed by Gibbs in
which an ensemble of systems is considered rather than a single
system with which Boltzman's Initial H-theorem was concerned. The
generalized approach by Gibbs, a more powerful method than that of
Boltzman, defines a similar quantity H which also decreases with time.
The quantiOT mechemical analogue of H may be considered in variational
fashion to yield the following expression
e e
in which E is the mean energy, A denotes the mean values of the
external forces calculated over the members of the ensemble, «5 a_
denotes the variations made in the external coordinates, and © is
a distribution parameter. The above equation is then compared to a
derived form of the combined first and second principles:
6 5 - 6_E +j_(A^6a^+ A,6a.^H-- • -) (^_^,
T T
The similarity of these two forms makes it reasonable to correlate




(and this particularly in view of the similarity in the tendency for
S to increase in natural processes as previously discussed) , Thus
we see that the quantity S may be expressed as
where Pj^ equals the (exact) probabilities for the true energy states
n in the canonical ensemble which we take as representing the equili-
brium, and k is a constant with the dimensions of energy over tempera-
ture which turns out to be Boltzmann's constant or the perfect gas
constant per molecule. When we consider the special case of a system
regarded as being with equal probability in one or another of a group
of W micro-states between which no distinction is made on the basis
of macro-scopic measurements, this relation reduces to
S -h log^W (^_,)
/^, Comparison
Thus we have indicated the development of the concept of entropy
from two standpoints which have been shown to be compatible with the
behavior of physical systems. From the statistical view, the entropy
is expressed as a function proportional to the probability of a state
of a particle system: S equals k log^ W, It is of interest to note
JC > rdo
on
the Clausius inequality, assumes the character of a pure number if the
temperature is measured in thermodynamic work units and hence is
compatible with the notion of probability. Both expressions for
entropy define a function^ whichj as a parameter of state, does not
decrease for any natural process in an isolated system. However, the
11
that the thenr-odynamic expression for entropy d J ^ J ?-2 , based

statistical approach more aptly explains the behavior of the system.
Irreversibility, for example, is not inherent in the dynamical motions
of the individual particles but in their combined mean effect. It is
to be noted that the concept of entropy does not appear in the
considerations of basic kinetic theory since this is based on the
dynamical treatment of the m.otion of individual particles within the
limitations of the assumptions of the kinetic model of matter.
Further comparison of the two approaches to the mathematical
development of entropy discloses additional points in which they
differ. For instance, thermodynamic entropy of a system is empiri-
cally defined for equilibrium states only, whereas from the statistical
standpoint, the entropy of a system can be determined for any state
whether or not equilibrium has been attained. Also, only changes
in entropy for reversible processes can be computed with equation (1,1)
while statistically the entropy can be detennined for the InitiEil and
final states of any process, reversible or irreversible, the difference
being the change. Finally, a comparison of basic equations shows the
empirical derivation to be a differential whose integral gives the
change in entropy from the initial to the final state or the entropy
referred to any arbitrary standard; the statistical entropy concept
makes possible the calculation of absolute entropy.
The method of Glbbs and of Boltzman have been mentioned previously
in connection with entropy as defined by statistical mechanics. An
additional method, that of Darwin and Fowler, provides an interesting
check on the other ways of looking at the problem and on certain
questionable approximations, e.g., the wide use of Sterling's formula
12

for N! can be avoided. This latter method approaches the problem
through the use of mean values. The assumption is, that in a very-
long period of time, a system would pass through all accessible states,
the time spent in each state being proportional to the number of
complexions of that state, L Lindsay 31 J
Having investigated the development of the entropy concept,
we are now in a position to summarize the more important features of
entropy and the second principle of thermodynamics.
a) There exists in nature a quantity which changes always in the
same sense in all natural processes. L Pla^^ck 39 J
b) The impossibility of an uncompensated decrease in entropy seems
to be reduced to an improbability. Q Klein 30 J by Gibbs.
c) Net growth of entropy in all bodies participating in an occurrence
means that the system as a whole has experienced an irreversible
change of state. This change is of course in harmony with the first
law of energy but this growth gives additional information as it
indicates the direction in which a natural process occurs. Q Klein 30 J
d) When all the participating bodies of the system are considered,
every natural event is marked by an increase in the number of complex-
ions of the system. This is the most precise physical statement of
the second law and covers the whole domain of science. L Klein 30 J
by Planck.
e) Entropy is a measure of the range in phase of the system.
Greater entropy goes with a greater ranging of the molecules over
molecule space, .... A non-equilibrium state is then one in which
full use is not being made by the system of the phase-space ranges
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that are open to it under the conditions to which it is subject so
that its behavior exhibits less phase range than in the state of
equilibrium, Q Kennard 29 D
f) A recent article by Muses suggests another interpretation of
entropy. A state of 100% entropy represents a condition of complete
lack of disturbance of the electromagnetic and gravitation mediiim.
The increase of entropy attendent to natural processes might then be
attributed to the elastic hysteresis loss of an elastic medium.
Certainly further study of Muses' article is required before
describing entropy in these terms. It is known, however, that elastic
hysteresis effects depend upon previous states as well as upon the
instantaneous conditions; and that the hysteresis loss is related to
the rate of loading and unloading, being less at slow rates. This
time dependence might correspond to the approach to reversibility in
thermodynamics when a process is conducted at ever slower rates.
g) Finally we give a mathematical concept which covers the whole
domain of physics: "Any function whose time variation always has the
same sign until a certain state is reached and is then zero may be
called an entropy function." Q Klein 30 3]
One final observation is in order. We have shown, using the
laws of mechanics and certain hypothesis, that statistical mechanics
is able to define a quantity whose mathematical behavior is the same
as that of the entropy of thermodynamics. The latter says that Z\ S
is equal to or greater than zero; the former says -f^ S is equal to or
greater than zero with overwhelming probability. There is a possi-
bility of almost accounting for the second principle by mechanical
u

reasoning. Thus one might be ifilllng to extrapolate this partial
success and to state that ultimately thermodynamic entropy and its f
statistical mechanical analogue vd.ll be found to be identical.
Although statistical mechanics theoretically provides a finite
though small possibility of reversing the second principle, in view
of the ir.odel assumed and assumptions made in the statistical develop-
ment, and because Planck's rigorous propositions supporting the
second principle have not been invalidated in practice, it is inadvis-




INFORMATION THEORY - COMhfUNICATION
1, Introduction and Definitions
Modem comniunication (or information) theory is the confluence
of two branches of science. One branch starts with the earliest
attempts of mathematicians, such as Kelvin and Heaviside, who applied
quantitative descriptions to problems of signal transmission. The
second started in the twenties of this century with the first theories
of noise and broadened into the statistical theory of communication
when Wiener, Kolmogoroff, and Shannon conceived not only the noise,
but also the messages as part of statistical series. Thus "pure"
communication theory appears as the application of two branches of
mathematics to communication processes — analysis on the one hand,
probability theory on the other — and forms itself a new branch of
applied mathematics. As such, it requires a solid foimdation of
physical laws and empirical data whenever it is applied to any
practical problem. General notions of the problems concerned with
efficient message formulation, transmission, and reception have been
known for some time. It is the great achievement of Shannon that he
was able to replace the rather vague meaning of the word "information"
by a more precise definition which allows the assignment of a numeri-
cal value to an amount of information and hence makes possible the
mathematical analysis of the content of messages and of a wide




The procedure used to develop the theory mathematically attacks
the problem from the cominunication standpoint since there the theory
found its first application. As a consequence, many of the terms
utilized are those peculiar to the engineering communication field,
A listing of additional definitions appears in Appendix 1} definitions
essential to the following discussion are inserted here.
(a) fixed constraint - In telegraphy for example, four symbols;
dot, dash, letter space, and word space are used. The
organization of the code forbids a letter space or
word space to follow a letter space or word space.
Such restrictions are called fixed constraints.
(b) probability constraint - Languages have constraints
controlled by usages. All letters in the basic alphabet
do not occur with the same frequency. Furthermore,
J
pairs of letters (digrams) and three letter systems
(trigram.s) have varying frequencies. This coupling
process continues up through word-word combinations
also having certain frequencies of occurrence. The
use of a language to transmit information thus involves
the consideration of probabi!^itv constraints,
(c) ergodicity - the existence of a unique (i.e., independent
of the initial condition) , non-vanishing probability of
each symbol or sequence of sjnnbols appearing in infinitely
long messages engendered by a set of intersymbol
correlation probabilities, Q Watanabe 51 "2
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(d) noise - signals which are not coherent with any signals
to which meaning is assigned in any transmission system.
(e) binary digit - a unit employed in the measurement of
information which determines a single choice between
equiprobable alternatives. The logarithmic base of
two is conventional and convenient in practice.
(f) message - a particular selection from among the symbols
or code elements constituting a code which has been
made in conformity with the restrictions applicable
to the occasion.
(g) information - in the most general sense, as that which
adds to any structure, abstract or concrete, of which
the features correspond in some sense with those of
another structure.
(h) communication system - a system comprised of those
elements "which are essential for the initiation,
transmission, and reception of intelligence-bearing
signals.
Communication systems can be roughly classified
into three categories; discrete, continuous, and
mixed. The discrete system is one in which both the
message and the signal are a sequence of discrete
symbols. Continuous and mixed systems will not be discussed
in this paper,
(i) signal element - a code element of a form which is
suitable for transmission over the medium,
18

In order to analyze a communication problem by means of mathe-
matical methods, a precise definition must be given which will allow
a numerical value to be assigned to a sequence of intelligence-bearing
symbols. Therefore, we shall employ the following definition to meet
this requirement:
The amount of information received in a message is defined as
Amount of Information P^^^
Received = log« (2.0)
°2 p
eb
where P^„ is the probability at the receiver of the event after the
message is received, and P^^ is the probability at the receiver of
the evert before the message is received. The use of the logarithm
makes the amount of information in independent messages additive.
Equation (2,0) will now be applied to several examples to demonstrate
its suitability.
2. Application of Equation
(a) m events, m symbols
Consider the problem of transm.itting over a noiseless and
discrete system the names of all residents of New York City and their
ages. In the noiseless case, the numerator in equation (2.0) is
unity. Assume that possible ages vary from one to one hundred
inclusive. Let p,2 be the probability that the age "twelve" will be
sent. Then the amount of infonnation received in a message wherein
"twelve" was the transmission = - log2 P 12» Since all ages are
assumed independent of one another, the total information can be
found by adding the information reported by separate symbols. If
19

there are m different people, then m X p]^2 equals the number of
transmissions of age "twelve" equals N-j^2» '^®" %2 ^ ^ ~ ^^^ ^12^
equals total information reported for these ll-]^2 sy^nbols. Summing
over all possible ages gives the total information which is
tilOO





All that is necessary for this equation to hold is that m be a large
number.
(b) An Ergodic Sequence
Consider the problem of a long ergodic sequence consisting of
m symbols, the symbols being taken from an alphabet of L symbols.
L Goldman 23 J Divide the sequence into r groups each consisting
of q symbols, the number q being chosen large enough to surpass the
inter-symbol influence. Thus r = m/q. Since the alphabet has L
symbols, there will be L^ different groups q symbols in length.
Let s = L^. The different symbol groups are specified as group
J
1,2, s and N,, Nj Ng are the number of each in the
original sequence. Then r = m/q = N^^ plus N2 plus N-^ ..... plus Ng,
The total number of combinations of r things taken N^ , N-, N
r'
at a time is Mm = * , Mm being the total number of
Nl] N2J Ng,
different possible arrangements of the m sjmibols in the original
sequence. Probability constraints enter the picture and thus for
20

the derivation to hold N^ = Pj^ X r, N^ = P2 X r N^ s p^ X r.
Taking the logarithm of M^ and using Sterling's approximation which
is for large numbers
Lh Nl - (N+ya)LnN-N+yz bnarf,
it is found that
S d
Since m was chosen verj/^ large, and q has a small range, r will be
large; hence, all but the first term may be dropped so that
bo nro = -A 2 pi In p^
Choosing any one particular sequence, we find that the probability
of that sequence is
Then 5
Since at this time we are dealing only with messages, let us modify
equation 2,0 to read Probability at the receiver
of the message after
The Amount of Language • transrnission received
Infonnfition teceived = K uO Probability at the ^^.15)
receiver of the message
before transmission received
It can be seen that for a noiseless channel, the amount of language
information received s
S




Since a very long sequence was broken down into r groups,
each of these groups can be considered as the basic unit and therefore.
The Aipount of Language 4
Information Received - -~ K S Pi^^Pi" (2.3)
per Unit i-1 '
( c ) Telegram Problem « multiple form symbols
The fundamental nature of this expression for information
received will be emphasized by one final exarrple. Brillouin (11
)
proposed a problem similar to the one just considered, A simplified
model of a telegram consisting of only dots and blanks was chosen.
If G positions were available, they would be filled with N^ dots
and N2 blanks such that G equals N, plus N^, Due to possible varia-
tions of pulses there might occur P types of dots and P types of
blanks. Since the G positions would all be filled but only a maximum
of one pulse or blank can fill a given position (cell), generalized
Fermi-Dirac Statistics are applicable,
G!
The total number of ways of filling the G cells is
and recalling the various tvpes of pulses, we must multiply this
expression by P P , Thus there are
** *" TTTki I total complexions. Any one given
message may be realized in P^*p'*tways. Hence the probability
of a specific message is
P^^^Pz^' on Ml'- M.'- = P
Utilizing equation (2,2) above for a noiseless channel, we see that
the amount of language information received per cell is - K Uo P.
22

By means of Sterling's approximation this can be shown to be
• 1=1
'
If it is seen that the p^ here correspond to those in the
previous example, that the G cells correspond to the r groups, and
finally that Pi , P2 represent types of pulses having the same
significance whereas in the previous example all groups were distinct,
then the parallelism between Brillouin's problem and the previous one
is apparent. In passing it is of interest to note that the analysis
of the problem given by Brlllouin involves the use of "physical
entropy" and "message entropy" which will be discussed in a sub-
sequent portion of this paper.
3. System with Noise
The three problems thus far considered have been limited to the
noiseless case or system. The receiver is sure that he has received
the exact message sent, and therefore the numerator of equation (2,0)
becomes unity. Attention will now be given to the more usual and
more involved case — the system with noise. Here the probability
of the message or event after receipt of the transmission is less
than unity. To show the effect of noise in the system on the infor-
mation received, equation (2,0) will be used with the following
notation: p^ - probability that i will be the transmitted message.
p' - probability that j will be the received message.
J
p 2 probability that j will be the received message
if i is the transmitted message.
From these notations it is seen that
23

I, J *» -I ^
p^ Pj — X if 1 and j are the sair«,
p- p- =r O if i and j are not the same, and
p. (i_) Z P" , These are altornate notations wherein the A refers
to the transmitter.
Denoting the receiver as E, let ?^{l) , be the probability that
1 is transmitted and j received. Before receiving the message, we
know the probability that i will be transmitted is
-p^, and that the
probability that i will be transmitted and j received is Pj^ X p^*.
After the received message is found to be j, this factor is increased
by l/p! since all cases where J is not the received m.essage are
excluded . Then
Equation (2,0) now reads
p. p. .
Amount of Information (oQ ^ i \oQ --—A*^
fleceived = •'* q .-. - __?*___
Relative to j r^
^*^ pT
[[ Goldman 23 3
In order to visualize the significance of this equation, it will
be applied to a simple problem. Suppose we have binary symbols (O)
and (l). Let P»(l) = .5 and P.(0) » ,5. During transmissioi> noise
affects the system, to the extent that l/lOO of the transmitted sym.bols
are received incorrectly Ltransmitted (O) received as (l) and vice
versa]]. Referring to the above notation, p,, = o99 = Pno i





Slnee 5^ Pi Pi j = Pj,
w
P' = .5 X .CI .5 X .99 = .5 and
P' s .5 X .99 + .5 X .01 = .5.




P (0) =: '^
^f^ « .01,
P^ (Do = ^^^ = .01.
P (o) s .5 X ,99 - QQ
a) if a (l) is transmitted and a (l) received,
r.99i
Amount of I, rec'd = log2
""T"" r '^^'^ binary digits per symbol,
b) if a (1) is transmitted and a (o) received,
r oil
Amount of I. rec'd S log^ ~ s -5.64. binary digits per symbol.
Were the system noiseless, we would have had instead of the above,
log ^ l/. 5 - 1 binary digit per symbol. Thus as in case a), even
though the transmHted symbol is the one received, the fact that
because of noise, a (c) could have actually been transmitted, in
effect reduces the amount of information received. Case b) presents
an interesting example due to the negative results. [.Woodward (55)
termed this "deception^J. To the recipient, the probability of (l)
being transmitted is initially ,5. Upon receiving (O), the a posteriori
probability of (l) having been transmitted is reduced to ,,01 despite
the fact that it was the transmitted symbol. Thus the trsmsmission
in the presence of noise has made the state even less probable than
it was to begin with,
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3, Ambiguities in the Phrase "Amount of Information. •*
The results of the examples just cbnsidered appeared in the
form "average amount of information per syinbol (or unit)." This
would seem to imply that a long message always reports a greater
amount of information than a short message. However, a brief
message carrying an account of a rare event may contain a greater
amount of information than a long message dealing with a common
occurrence. The above ambiguity arises from the fact that "amount
of information" may be given different interpretations. Before
attempting to resolve this ambiguity, the interpretations of this
phrase (or of terms closely related to it) which have been assigned
by writers in the field in Information Theory will be recounted.
Signals are complexes of data transmitted from one
physical system to another, and they convey information
only if they are not predictable from the data previously
received. Thus incomplete knowledge of the future, and
also of the past of the transmitter from which the future
might be constructed, is at the very basis of the concept
of information. On the other hand, complete ignorance
also precludes communication; a common language is required,
that is to say an agreement between the transmitter and the
receiver regarding the elements used in the communication
process The information of a message could now be
defined as the ' minimum number of binary decisions which
enable the receiver to reconstruct the message, on the basis
of the data already available to him. ' These data comprise
both the convention regarding the symbols and the language
used, and the knowledge available at the moment when the
message started.
In this form, however, the definition is a counsel of
perfection, of little practical use and even partly self-
contradictory. It requires individual discussion of every
given situation, which may not be exactly repeatable. In
order to make it practical and meaningful, there must be
added the important clause that the definition applies only
to the average of a great number of samples, taken at random
from a statistically homogeneous or 'ergodic' series. By
this assumption (which is extremely difficult to define in a
completely rigorous way) the previous contradiction is avoided,
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On the other hand, it is clear that information in the exact
sense of comininication theory is far more restricted than the
vague concept which goes by this name in everyday life. It
may be also mentioned that this definition has nothing to do
with the "value" of information. It is a measure of the
minimum effort or cost by which the message can be transmitted,
not of its importance or consequences. L Gabor 21 J
the reader must be warned that there is some risk
of confusion between three different quantities which are all
likely to be measured in the same units. There is first the
information capacity of a communication channel, which for
telegraphic purposes could be measured in binary digits per
second. Then there is the information content of a signal as
transmitted, which for a telegraphic signal could be again
measured in binary digits. Finally there is something which
is proportional to the degree of confidence of the recipient
of the message that he has received it correctly. L B«il 3 J
Hartley purposely confined his attention to capacity,
which is a quantity characteristic of a physical system. He
was aware that "psychological factors" might have to be taken
into account when defining an actual quantity of information,
and assiomed that these factors would be irrelevant to the
communication engineer. The especially interesting feature
of present day theory is the realization that information
content differs from capacity not so much for psychological
reasons as for purely statistical reasons which can very
profitably be taken into mathematical account. Shannon's
statistical treatment does indeed explain the "psychological"
aspects of information to a quite remarkable degree
When a comroTinication is received, the state of knowledge of
the rec:^pient or "observer" is changed, and it is with the
meas\3rement of such changes that communication theory has to
deal...,. The information content of a message may be defined
as the minimum capacity required for storage, [^ Woodward 55 j
The effect of the information in a message is to change
the probability concerning a situation, as far as the receiver
of a message is concerned, from its value before the message
is received to what is usually a larger value after the
message is received. In a general way, it would appear that
the amount of information in the message should be measured
by the extent in the change in probability produced by the
message languages, as we all know, are used in transmission
channels to transmit Information. The first step in this
process is the coding of the messages at the information
source into the (English) message alphabet. Thus, for example,
an event occurs at the information source, and its description
for transmission is its coded equivalent in the message
alphabet. We have used the same word "message" for both the
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event and its description . When it is desirable to make a
distinction, we shall call the former, the event , and we shall
call its coded equivalent in the language the messagg.
L Goldman 23 3
In order that the message should carry information, there
must be a probability at some receiver concerning the occurrence
of the event which can be changed by the reception of the
message According to our terminology, if p is the
probability of a particular message in a language and p is the
probability of the event which it describes, then we will
say that (-log p) is the amount of language information in
the message and (^log p) is the amount of semantic information
in the message. L Goldman 23 J
It is apparent that there is a lack of a unified basis for discus-
sion in the above points of view. Bell warns the reader of this in
the first quotation. Woodward mentions "information content" and
"information capacity" bringing out the belief that "phychological
factors" enter into the measurement of quantity of infonnation. In
the next quotation, Goldman points out the manner in which "amount
of information" alters the probability concerning a situation, and
differentiates between an event and the message describing it. The
event is distinguished from the message by calling the logarithm of
its probability the amount of semantic information, while th^ logarithm
of the probability of the message describing the event is termed
amount of language information. In another quotation, this one being
from Gab or, information is defined in terms of the number of binary
decisions which the receiver must make to reconstruct the message.
Considerable unity and clarity are achieved in the basic analysis
of the scope of information theory by the statements of Mackay (34-):
General Information theory is concerned with the problem
of measuring changes in knowledge. Its key is the fact that
we can represent what we know by means of pictures, logical
statements, symbolic models, or what you will. When we
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receive information, it causes a change in the symbolic picture,
or representation, which we would use to depict what we know
v,^.v, ?
^^^^^ T.^ ^° ^^®P ^" "^^""^ ^^^^ "^^i^" o^ a representation .which is a crucial one. Indeed, the subject matter of generalinformation theory could be said to be the making of represen-
^^j°"s *^« different ways in which representation can beproduced, and the numerics both of the production processes and
01 the representations themselves.
By throwing our spotlight on this representational activity,
we find ourselves able to formulate definitions of the central
notions of information theory which are operational , with more
resultant advantages than that of current respectability. Inany question or debate about "amount of information," we have
simply to ask: "what representational activity are we talking
about, and what numerical parameter is in question?" And we
eliminate most of the ground for altercaUons or we shoulddo so if we are careful enough'
"infn!tjr uT"^'. I think, all technical senses of the term
loH^rrf M^ defining it operationally as that which
.logically enables thP r.^.Tyer to m«k. n. add tTTT^^^.r.,.^^ ^^
£ that which is the c..., nr is beli.vpd o. .^...:.TSl,''^^°''
^g-^ i^econceivld possibilities: that is the key
a^ume's ^hat^^'r^'r ''^°"^- '^' °<=™nication engineer
lllT^tlil l\ receiver possesses a filing cabinet ofprefabr cated representations, so that for him a signal is
o? pos^TbJii?? '° f^ r '^°^ '^'—^^^ or^'e';;:'.!^"01 si il ties already foreseen and Provided for. His
se'?ecHv^'
°"%\"'''^''^ '' "°^ ^ constructional ^t a
ll^Zllr
°P^^^^i°"--;-- Amount of selective information isevidently a measure of the
.statistical rarity of a represen!
c^ntent"Lc:^t"?
'''''' logical connecti^ith its ^o^'";
statuf ' S ^ ^" ufT ''^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^-^ i^s statisticalatus. One word which was unexpected could yield more
!hlnh h'^'J^^^'^^''^? '" " ^'^''^'^ ^h-" - whole paragraphw ic e knew he would receive
^ gx-a n
is observed I" tl^^T. ^^
^"'^ situation in which whatis thought of as specifying one out of an ensemble
info^'n
""''"' possibilities, the amount of selective
con^^ L ^° ^P^J^^i^d <^^ in principle be computed! The
?^rof co™;un?'':f°'':.' ""'' ^'^" '°^i" °^ u^iX^lness thanthat of mm ication theory. The point is that it is alwavra relevant parameter of a communicaUon process, becausesuccessA.1 comrmmication depends on symbols h^^lng si^ificancefor the receiver, and hence on their being already income
c"rs\''l ^''%':' f" "''"• ^^ P^-^i-^ diffi^lty o?ourse, is to estimate the proportions of the appr^oprikeensemble, when these are determined by selectively !! and evenunconsciously
-- assessed probabilities. Q Kackay 3A j
The ambiguity arising with respect to the amount of information
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reported by long and short messages is resolved if one considers the
problem in the light of the interpretation given by Mackay. The
notions of preconceived possibilities, representation, selection, and
statistical rarity together point the way toward a reasonable explana-
tion. An unusual event would stand very low on the observer's ladder
of preconceived possibilities. Consequently, in his representation,
he would assign the occurrence of that event a low probability. The
opposite procedure would be applied to an event of common occurrence.
Equation (2,0) contains the a priori probability P^ which can be
considered as that assigned in the observer's representation. Since
P v^ appears in the denominator of the logarithmic term, the receipt
of a message describing an event to which a small a priori probability
was assigned would yield a greater amount of information than would
the receipt of a message describing a less statistically rare event.
Hence, the amount of information per symbol attained from a given
message depends not only upon the number of symbols in the message,
but also upon the statistical rarity of the event recounted by the
message. With reference to the differentation between semantic and
language information given by Goldman, the above discussion pertains
only to events which are in the category of semantic information.
However, reference can be made to equation (2,15), and the same
discussion applied to language information if we speak of statistical
rarity with regard to particular sequences or configurations of
symbols or units.
At the very basis of the analysis of information theory quoted
from Mackay are the concepts of representation and selection , the
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latter being concerned with the- choice, from tJie assembly of possi-
bilities making up the representation, of one designated by an incoming
signal. On the basis of this choice and the statistical rarity of
that possibility chosen, the receiver derives an amoimt of selective
information
.
Earlier in this chapter three example problems were
explained through the use of equations (2.0) and ^.15) which involve,
respectively, semantic and language information. They can also be
discussed in the light of selective information. Exarrple (a) dealt
with the ages of the population of New York City. The receiver knows
in advance the symbol significance and the message form of the communi-
cation system. He also knows that the incoming message will pertain
to population age data for New York City. Based upon whatever know-
ledge he might have of age distribution for a normal population, the
receiver forms a representation, assigning a priori probabilities to
each age of the assembly of ages. Then each transmission of a name
and age would instruct him to select that age from his representational
assembly. Through the use of equation (2.0) the receiver can compute
the amount of semantic information received. Since, however, he has
used the a priori probabilities from his representation to compute
this amount, the receiver has also determined the amount of selective
information received. Example (b) (ergodic sequence) and example (c)
(simplified telegram) are concerned with language information. Here
again the receiver is familiar with the symbol significance and the
message form of the communication system, but, because of lack of
additional knowledge, he is unable to assign a probability of zero to
"non-pertinent" symbol sequences. Hence, his prior representation
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consists of the possible selections available
to the message originator
and their respective probabilities. Then the
receipt of any particular
sequence instructs the receiver which one to
choose from his predeter-
mined "ensemble" of possibilities. By substituting
the corresponding
a priori probability into equation (2.15) and
carrying through the
necessary computation, the receiver determines the
amount of language
information received. In this case, amount of selective
information
eorresponds to amount of language information since the
a priori




Thus, from its application to the three examples, its
ability to
explain the apparent ambiguity arising when considering
the amount of
information received from long and short messages, and,
finally, the
manner in which it is able to bring together the
interpretations of
information given by various authors in the field of
information
theory, the analysis of information theory proposed by
Mackay api^ears




INFORMATION THEORY AND ENTROPY
1, Introduction
Chapters I and II have considered the following formulae:
Entropy Amount of Information
S =
-hlo9eW I = K logtM^
The question now arises that although I and S are expressed in a
similar form, are the phenomena related? It has been stated in
the consideration of entropy that the greater the entropy of a
state the higher the probability of that state. With reference
to an amount of inforiration, it may be deduced from equation
(2.C) that the less probable a certain event is, in the representa-
tion of the receiver, the more information a message carrying news
of that event conveys. Thus
Amount of Information = ^^Sp : ^ * ^^^2 p^»
probability of an ^B
event before trans-
mission is received
Let I take on an increment A I and P^ an increment A P„j
Then I A I s log^ 1 or 2-^*^^- -^
It follows that, if A Pg > then A I <: 0,




Bell (3) states ~ Information is the negative of entropy.
This means that the potential information content of any
pattern can be assessed mathematically by the same process
used to define the entropy Having progressed from
entropy as a parameter of heat engines to entropy as a
measure of disorder, there is no difficulty in taking the
further step of relating a decrease of entropy to an
increase of information.
If a book were set up in type, it would be in an ordered state
and would provide a means of conveying information. Were this type
broken up, the "entropy" of the system of letters would be greatly
increased while the information would be destroyed. This example
points to the relationship between information and the negative of
"entropy" or negentropy.
All discussion thus far with regard to information and entropy
brings to light one important peculiarity exhibited by the information
fonmila. If the amount of information behaves like negentropy
. why is
its formula, ignoring the constants k
,
identical with that of entropy?
As a stepping stone in the development of the reasoning behind this
apparent ambiguity, let us first of all add to the list of definitions
of entropy the following: entropy is a measure of roughness of
knowledge with the observer included in the system
.
Woodward (55) states — the information function is really
a measure of prior ignorance in terms of prior probabilities.
When the message state is known, probabilities become certainties,
the ignoreince is removed, and information correspondingly
gained
.
The observer is the recipient of the information, and it is upon his




Consider again equation (2.0). Suppose the probability of
receiving a given message is p . At the same time, let the communi-
cation channel be subject to noise so that the probability at the
receiver after the message is received is p^ . Then we would have
that the amount of information received = log p^^ = log 1 - log 1 «
Based on statements above, this may be written as the amount of
information received s prior ignorance - final ignorance. Or in
terms of the extended definition of entropy implied above, the amount
of information received = initial entropy - final entropy. In the
noiseless case, P, = 1 and the simount of information received
becomes equal to the initial entropy.
(a) Mine Problem
To further illustrate this extended concept of entropy, let us
apply it to this simple example. Suppose an armored battalion intelli-
gence officer learns that a specified area to his front contains a
powerful anti-tank mine. In referring to his map, he finds that the
area under consideration extends over 32 co-ordinate squares as shown



















Fig, 1 Mine field in which one ground mine is known to be concealed
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The circumstances are such that he considers the mine has an
equal chance of being in any one of the 32 squares. Thus the proba-
bility of the mine being in a given square is l/32. Then his initial
ignorance is log^ 32 or 5 binary digits. A mine detection team is
ordered into the area and returns with the report that the mine was
not discovered. Their search covered the twenty-four squares indicated
on the preceding diagram. The final ignorance of the intelligence
officer is log2 8 or 3 binary digits. Therefore the information
gain is 2 binary digits. From the standpoint of "entropy," with the
initially specified area and the intelligence officer making up the
system, it may be stated that the system in its initial state had
5 binary digits of "entropy" with respect to the mine location.
Upon the receipt of information, the "entropy" of the system was
reduced to three binary digits. In other words, the information
gain resulted in an "entropy" loss; the information gain acted to
produce a more ordered state of affairs - i.e. 2U squares were
opened for passage or occupancy,
(b) Physical Entropy Example
Another example, proposed by Brillouin (12), of the relationship
between entropy and amount of information on a more involved scale
should suffice to substantiate the proposition that information is the
negative of entropy. The example was previously discussed from a
different point of view in Part II. Let us suppose, in this case,
that we are concerned with the probability distribution in phase
space of electrons, originally in thermodynamic equilibrium, along a
telegraphic wire. We assume that the passage of an assemblage of
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electrical impulses of finite diiration will affect only a small
sub-
ensemble of the total group. The choice of this sub-ensemble
is
determined by the constraints imposed on the overall system through
the
specification of a message of a given length which contains a certain
number of impulses of different types. From the observer's end, since
he originally knows of these constraints, the number of ways in
which
these electrons can be distributed after the passage of a particular
assemblage is given by the number of possible distributions of the
impulses. Referring to Problem (c) in Part II, this is:
/Nil Nil
Since all of these messages are equally probable, the physical entropy
of the sub-ensemble of electrons is given by:
Sp.,, =ft U Pt^^Pt^'Gl/N^i N^p (3.1)
'"''f^S'^ SpU,Vp_,-K(-hUA-f'.V.n^). (3.2)
However, since in the given conditions of the problem. Pi represents
pulses (dots) which vary in shape, intensity, and length, and Pj has
the same connotation with regard to the dashes, the transmission of
Nl N2
any one of the above configurations can be received in P, ^2
% N2
ways. Then, since the observer is unaware of which of the P^ P2
ensembles was transmitted, these become representative of his uncer-
tainty as to the final configuration of the electron sub-ensemble
brought about by the instantaneous passage of one of these possible
received groups of impulses. We can denote the final or message
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entropy of the sub-ensemble by:
Sm/pe^ ceU ^^Cp^Ln R * (i.i.'r^P,), (3-3)
The difference between the physical and message entropies, as shovm
below:
S pk^s - Stn =. - ^ ^ P£ tn p, =. X ^ , (3.4)
yields a measure of the information received concerning the distribution
of the electrons making up the sub-ensemble. The gain of information
reduces the observer's statistically characterized physical entropy of
the system. Here we have obtained a physical measure for information
only because our assembly (that being the sub-ensemble of electrons
along a cable) was defined to be originally in thermodynamic equili-
brium. Our results show that information corresponds to a negative
term in the final entropy of the system
j
Sid - Sph\/5. — X<^.
If the system were noiseless (i.e., only one kind of dot and
dash thus making
^i - Pp ~ ^^» ^m '''°"^*^ ^® zero. This result implies
absolute certainty on the part of the receiver. Then S j^^g = I-,
3. Unit Difficulties
Although in the simple examples discussed "information" and the
negative of entropy have exhibited a similarity in form and a corres-
pondence in behavior, there is still much confusion in the literature
on information theory as to the relationship between the two quantities.
The following comments are proposed in an attempt to clear up some of
the ambiguity. As Bell (3) points out, there is room for argument as
to whether there is a "real" or "physical" connection between the two.
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with for™la (2.0), two as the convenient ba.e fc. logarithms was
arrived at by taking K : one In the »ore general equation:
I»Klog„ Probability at the receiver of the event after n..„...
Probability at the receiver of the event before „,essage'
This is convenient and custonary in infonnatlon theory as previously
pointed out. When infonnatlon is related to the entropy of a given
then.ody:,a,.io system by writers such as Brlllouta, K is set equal to
Boltzmann's constant. To quote Bell (3)1
whereas negentropy Includes Boltzioann's constant knd Jill
' Zlt^.^l^T'"^: ^^"^ ^= '"^'•^ly « numerical ™nstent
.....{without dimensions). For example, it is definitTth.tkT represents an energy, but it has not been usual toapportion the dimensions of energy between k and T Ifnegentropy Is identical with lnf??mationrit Is T ^lonf
^rleSe'e cLh'"*^"^ "^'^ ^"«'-^' «"^ ^' -aLr d in ergsf*^_'^^Sr«« "^ntlgrade. Is a cure number which has the value
the scale l7r']tSi '' *'"°* *"* '^'^°^ "^^^^^ ^ =0"^r?
of freedom!!.!. ^^'*'
centigrade to ergs per degree
Bell admits that in his previous discussions he has tacitly ^
employed the point of view of regarding entropy as a n«thematlcal
abstraction representing pattern. He then concludes that there Is a
case for making entropy a mathematical abstraction (a pure number)
rather than an energy function and that if this Is admitted, the
identity of information with the negative of entropy follows l»edlately.
It appears that the difficulty proposed by Bell stems from the
idea that if physical entropy is made a dimenslonless quantity, that
It is no longer pl^sical entropy _ that is, a characteristic of
thermodynamic state indicating a definite "natural tendency." Here
It appears, however, that the basic consideration is one of measurement
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and units employed. If in the Clausius equation for entropy (which
is empirically derived and hence the foundation for other derivations)
the temperature is measured in absolute work units * then entropy becomes
a pure number but one nevertheless related to the energy of a system,
Wilson (53) » in an excellent discussion on dimensions, has made the
point as follows:
Turning to thermal quantities, we may use as a substitute
for temperature the Villard Gibbsian modulus which is equal
to k © , where k is Boltzmann's constant and G is the Kelvin
work scale temperature. If we represent this temperature
substitute by Q> its dimensions are those of energy. Entropy
would thus acquire the dimensions of a "pure numberj* since its
nature appears to be that of a probability, this would seem
very appropriate.
Measurement of temperature in work units may be accomplished by
using a Camot engine as the thermometer along with some arbitrary
assumptions as to standard and range. It will be recalled that when
the generalized H-theorem of Gibbs was expressed in a form to give a
parallel result with the thermodynamic entropy, the Boltzmann's
constant made its appearance in the expression for the statistical
analogue of entropy S = - k H , If temperature is measured in work
\inits, then the Boltzmann's constant becomes a pure number, and hence
both thermodynamic entropy and its statistical mechanical analogue
become pure numbers which are nonetheless related to a system with
given a priori constraints.
U* Conclusion
The confusion in identifying an amount of infomnation with entropy
stems from the extended use of the word entropy. Clarity of discussion
may be achieved by calling the expression: ~ K 2 P- 1 Oq p-

an entropy of a probability distribution in which
2 pi - 1 and Pi. ~ O.
This is a general nomenclature which is not limited to a thermodynamic
system of specified character for which the term "thermodynamic
entropy should be reserved. The entropy given by the formula
in statistical mechanics, corresponds to the thermodynamic entropy,
not in mathematical form but in the results it gives. The entropy of
statistical mechanics describes a property of a thermodynamic model
of specified characteristics which is selected on the basis of its
appropriateness in portraying a thermodynaml. system
. Therefore,
an ariount of information may be identified wi^h the negative of a
change in thermodynamic entropy when the ensem.ble of interest in the
information theory corresponds in behavior and constraint to the
ensemble of the thermodyi^amic model employed to describe a system in
thermodynamic equilibrium. Such a conclusion agrees substantially
with that offered by MacKay (31)
j
In t^;;;*:/!!^/^?.?!^"® ^^"^^ ^^^ selective inform,ationi erms of probabilities, you arrive at something which
mech«M
'"^^
"^ '' '^" definition of entropy in statistical
a^o^ r.';;;;;'''^ T ^''^^''^^ ^° °p"^^^^ ^" ^^^ ^ w that
1, 11 if! T^"^ ^"^ ^® °^" ^^^^^^ ®^°^ °^ those signals asequally likely. Consequently, we are referring our questionas to the amount of selective information to a^ ensemble
appropriate to the assumption that all of those states areequally probable
- in which, if you like, all possible
states are equally represented.
fv,o i^^" r T^"^^^^^ ^^^ ^°^^ °^ physical entropy, on
to « K^^^ ' "^ ^""^ referring to the ensemble appropriatea physical system in equilibrium at tem.perature T. for
which not all possible states are equally probable.

..... And I think that all the debates and paradoxes
which keep cropping ur as to the relation between Shannon's
amount of selective information and the concept of physical
entropy disappear if one asks precisely what assembly isbeing used for the computation of the amount of selectiveinformation You get the physical measure if you use
an assembly defined for thermodynamic equilibrium; and you getquite a different measure, of course, if you use the artificial
assembly (the filing cabinet of the receiver) that regards
all states equally likely. In that case, it is the metricalinformation content* and not the selective information
content that correlates with physical entropy increase.






In the previous chapters, interest has centered on a mathematical
definition of "amotint of information" which has application in the
study of communication systems. The implication has been that by
arriving at a precise evaluation of the product of a communication
system, i.e., an amount of information, and how this product is
modified by noise and by the physical and probability constraints
imposed, the investigator is enabled by suitable choice of system
characteristics to achieve maximum efficiency. It has been indicated
that equation (2.0) or its modification (2.15) are applicable in
measuring the amount of selective information . The former is perti-
nent to the amount of semantic information and the latter to the
eunount of language information. In each we are concerned with statis-
tical rarity — of an event in (2.0) | of a message in (2,15). The
distinction between these measures lay in the specification of which
representational ensemble, previously existing in the past experience
of the receiver, was being employed by the sender. It was seen that
the nature of the ensembles constituting a representation was also
important in the comparison of entropy ernd information.
In the present and succeeding chapters, we are concerned not with
the replication of pre-fabricated representations, but rather with the
formulating of representations of some physical aspect of sensory
A3

experience. The latter problem is treated in Scientific Information
Theory. Here, as in the Communication Theory, the method is to make
such definitions within the system so that the influence of the various
components may be varied to optimize the functioning of the system for
the Intended purpose. In the following chapter, aspecl^p of a Scientific
Measurement system which correspond to various features of a Communi-
cation system will be proposed. However, in addition to a parallelism
which appears reasonable, there is the relationship between information
and measurement which has appeared in the Maxwell Demon discussions hy
Szilard and later by Brillouin. This relationship makes impossible
the violation of the second principle of thermodynamics by the demon
acting in a specified manner within a closed system. In order to
effect a condition of lower entropy in the system, the demon requires
information. However, since the demon obtains the information by a
form of physical measurement, he produces an increase in the physical
entropy (considering the entire system of demon, gas molecules,
container, and measuring apparatus) of the system greater than the
decrease he is able to accomplish with the information obtained.
Brillouin concludes that the scientific experimenter is subject to the
same type of restriction as besets the demon, and that there are
limitations to the possibilities of measurements which have nothing
to do with the uncertainty relations cf quantum mechanics. Z Brillouin 11 J
Prior to a more detailed consideration of Scientific Information
Theory in measurement, several viewpoints on measurement in general
and on quantum measurement will be set forth. Such an endeavor will
be brief and of limited selection as befitting the scope of this paper.

However, it will provide some insight as to how certain factors involved
in Scientific Measurement might lend themselves to the methods of
Information Theory.
Similarities between a coranmnication system and a scientific
information syster: may become more readily apparent in the following
excerpts if it is assumed that the communication system of reference
has the following features:
(a) A discrepancy between a signal as transmitted and a signal
as received may be attributed to noise,
(b) Noise may enter the system at any point.
(c) Noise may be of the distortion variety in which there is a
functional relationship between transmitted and received
signals, or of the random variety in which there is no
functional relationship, or of a combination of both varieties.
(d) Noise reduces the "amount of information received" in a
message,
(e) Known constraints reduce the a priori uncertainty and hence
reduce the amount of information received in a message,
(f) The transfer of information requires a transformation of
energy.
(g) A message is a particular selection from an ensemble of
possible messages.
(h) Manipulations upon information from a source tend to reduce
the amount of information in a message. Translation or
modulation from one code system to another or from one scale
to another could be classed as manipulations in this sense,
ii5

(i) Ultimate delivery of a message to the human receiver
necessitates that the message be put in a form which lies
within his range of sensory response,
2, Scientific Measurement - General
Margenau (35) takes the position that the observer or experimenter
is an entity but one that is in continuous interaction with the
surroundings. He comments that failure to take into account the
functioning of the observer within the system is outmoded and in
disharmony with the successful phases of contemporary physics. There
is common ground between the assumptions and rules of the scientist
and the idea of constraints in communication theory. With regard to the
former, Margenau states: »
Every scientist must invoke assumptions or rules of
procedure which are not dictated by sensory evidence as such,
rules whose application endows a collection of facts with
internal organization and coherence, makes them simple,
makes a theory elegant and acceptable. Ask an investigator
why he prefers a simple explanation, vfhy he hangs his knowledge
of the universe upon a continuous and undifferentiated
reference frame of space and time when his immediate experience
is strongly accented by peaks of attention amid valleys of
boredom.
Now it happens that science in its more advanced stages
is interested primarily in experiences of a highly specific
type, called measurements. All measurements involve numbers .
But this generalization should not be understood as barring
from scientific interest many observations which do not
yield numbers, examples of which are easy to cite. Suppose,
for instance, that according to some theory a certain substance
should emit a spectral line in a given spectral region and
that according to another the line is forbidden. Whether or
not it occurs is a matter of much importance, and it is settled
wholly without an appeal to number. Again, it may be of great
value to know whether two straight lines drawn on paper do or
do not intersect. Observations of this sort again are not
significantly represented as numbers; in our sense they are not
measurements, but they are nevertheless important.
^6

Turning now to measurements proper, we note a variety
of ways in which they lead to numbers. Eddington believed
that all measurements result from readings of the position
of pointers on a scale, but in this he strained the facts
for the sake of uniformity. To wit, there is at least one
important kind of measurement that cannot be reduced to
pointer readings, namely, counting. Much useful information
was obtained by the early workers in the field of radio-
activity through the tedious process of counting scintilla-
tions on a screen or by listening to the clicks of a relay
activated by a Geiger counter. Observations on the growth
of an embryo and on cell division yield numbers, though not
via pointer readings. All these activities should be classi-
fied as measurements in the wider sense,
measurement involves (l) an object (in our termin-
ology a physical system) upon which an operation is to be
performed; (2) an observable whose value is to be determined}
(3) some apparatus by means of which the operation can be
carried out,
Spontaneous experience is richer than logic,
to be sure, but it is also richer than language, which is
a primitive form of logic. The rational can be adequately
symbolized, either by ordinary language or in some other way,
but the immediately sensed loses its fullness upon express-
ion. Again the metaphor of a penumbra comes to mind. The
process of translating experience into language may be
likened to the projection of the shadows of objects upon
a screen. A point source of light casts sharp geometrical
shadows, a broad source surrounds each shadow with a region
of haziness. It is as though the source of illumination
increased in size as we proceed from reflective to spon-
taneous or sensory experience. We may now properly Judge
the transition from meaning to language to logic. Some-
thing vital is sacrificed in every one of the steps
involved, and_the loss is greatest in the field near
perception. L Margenau 35 J
Paraphrasing N. R. Campbell, we may say that measurement,
in the broadest sense, is defined as the assignment of
numerals to objects or events according to rules. The
fact that numerals can be assigned under different irules
leads to different kinds of scales and different kinds of
measurement. The problem then becomes that of making
explicit (a) the various rules for the assignment of numerals
(b) the mathematical properties (or group structure) of the
resulting scales, and (c) the statistical operations appli-
cable to measurements made with each type of scale the
most liberal and useful definition of measurement is "the
assignment of numerals to things so as to represent facts
and conventions about them.** Q Stevens ^.8 J
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In any measurement it is necessary to have some system
that we regard as the measuring apparatus and from whose
state we can draw inferences about the systems we are observing.
In order that this be possible, it is necessary that the
measuring apparatus interact with what is observed in a known and
calculable fashion Hence, if we wish to make observations
that are accurate enough to reach the quantum level, an element
of incomplete determinism enters into the interaction between
the apparatus and what is observed. This behavior is totally
different from that predicted by classical theory, which says
that the disturbance resulting from the measuring apparatus
can be made arbitrarily small, and can be corrected for by means
of the deterministic classical laws involved, even if it is
not made negligibly small, [_ Bohm 6 J
The whole subject-matter of exact science consists of
pointer readings and similar indications. We ceuinot enter
here into the definition of what are to be classed similar
indications. The observation of approxima-^p coincidence of
the pointer with a scale-division can generally be extended to
include observation of any kind of coincidence — or, as it
is usually expressed in the language of the general relativity
theory, as an intersection of world-lines. The essential
point is that, although we seem to have very definite con-
ceptions of objects in the external world, those conceptions
do not enter into exact science and are not in any way confirmed
by it. Before exact science can begin to handle the problem,
they must be replaced by quantities representing the results
of physical measurement There is always the triple
correspondence — (a) a mental image, which is in our minds
and not in the external world; (b) some kind of counterpart
in the extei*nal world, which is of insciru table nature; (c)
a set of pointer readings, which exact science can study and
connect with other pointer readings, Q Eddington 17 J
We have now to consider whether the doctrine that
science must be based on observation needs any modification,
in view of the fact that discoveries in physics of the most
unexpected kind and of the greatest importance are frequently
made by methematicians who have never performed, or even
seen an experiment in their lives Before Maxwell, the
story is one of performing experiments and devising formulae
to represent the results. But the post-Maxwellian period is
wholly different in character The change in the method
of discovery after Maxwell may be illustrated by a simple
analogy. Suppose that a map of Scotland is pasted on stiff
cardboard and then cut up into small irregular pieces, so
that it can be used as a jigsaw puzzle. Anyone who tries
to solve the puzzle does not at first know what is represented
and his only possibility of procedure is to find pieces which
fit into each other and so constitute larger parts of the whole.

After a tiire, however, he will have progressed sufficiently
to be able to guess that what is represented is Scotland, and
from that time onward he completes the work not by finding
pieces which fit into each other, but by using a priori
knowledge of Scotland to put every fragment into its proper
place. These two methods may be likened to the two types
of research in physical science: the earlier, proceeding
step by step by experiment in special topics; and the later,
knowing a priori what ought to be, because a guiding principle
is now available for the whole, permitting extension of
knowledge by purely rational methods. Q Whittaker '^L, J
The instruments of thermodynamics include thermometers
and instruments for determining the various mechanical
parameters, such as pressures or stresses or electrical
or magnetic fields. They must not be large compared with
the geometry of the boundaries of the systems we have to
deal with, and they must be small enough so that with the
help of them the given system can be analyzed into elements
each of which is sensibly homogeneous As the size of
the instruments is diminished, the data first pass through
wide fluctuations imposed by the gross geometry of our
system; that is, at first a single instrument may be trying
to straddle a piece of iron and a piece of copper. As the
instruments get smaller, their indications smooth out and
approach a smooth level plateau. As they get still smaller,
fluctuations again begin to manifest themselves. The
universe of thermodynamic operations is restricted to the
region of the plateau. It is also a matter of experiment
that there is such a plateau. Q Bridgman 7 J
Dimensions and Measurement
(l) A physical quantity may be taken as anything that
can be measured by one or more strictly definable processes,
(2) A measurement of a physical quantity generally consists
(and could, if desired, always consist) in principle of a
numerical comparison of the quantity with an arbitrarily
chosen unit ; the result of the measurement, represented in
physical equations by a symbol, will be called the magnitude
of the corresponding physical quantity. (3) Every magnitude
appearing in a general equation represents the result of a
measurement of a physical quantity by a unique, strictly
specified process. (4-) Magnitudes are of two kinds —
fundamental and derived . A fundamental magnitude is one
whose value is unaltered by any change in the process of
measurement, or in the chosen unit, of any physical quantity
other than the one to which it refers, A derived magnitude
is one whose value is in general altered by such a change,
(5) The number of fundamental magnitudes is arbitrary. (6)
A derived magnitude may be uniquely expressed in terms of

those fundamental magnitudes, a change in the units or
processes of measurement of which produces an alteration
in its value. (?) Physical equations are of two kinds —
definitions of derived magnitudes, and experimentally
established relatione
. (?) When every magnitude occurring in
a physical equation is reduced to fundamental magnitudes,
every term in the equation consists of the same magnitudes
raised to the same powers; i.e., the equation is homogeneous
in each magnitude. (9) The power to which each fundamental
occurs in the reduced expression of a term in a physical
equation is called the dimension of that fundamental
magnitude in the corresponding term. (10 ) Dimensions are
characteristics of magnitudes, which are the results of
measurements of physical quantities by strictly specified
processes; they are not characteristic of physical quantities
themselves. L Dingle 16 J
Dingle, in commenting on ambiguity in modem physics concerning
the choice of fundamental magnitude, gives two examples: the measure-
ment of temperature and the measurement of time in which incompati-
bilities result because of absence of agreement on how these magnitudes
are to be measured,
As things are at present, one often does not
know what is meant when certain magnitudes are mentioned.
This would be bad enough if only formal expressions were
at stake, but actually matters are much worse; it is the
laws which our equations express that have become ambiguous,
and the ambiguity is not realized When length is
measured in terras of a standard rod, and time in terms of
the rotation of the Earth, Newton's First Law of Motion
becomes a hypothesis to be tested. One test (indirect, but
valid) is the comparison of the observed with the calculated
tracks of ancient eclipses. A discrepancy is found, which
means that Newton's law is inaccurate.
Astronomers, however, do not draw this conclusion;
they say that the Earth is slowing down, while Newton's law
remains true. But this means that the rotating Earth is
abandoned as the standard of time measurement, and the
scale implied by Newton's First Law is substituted for it.
Equal times are then, b^ definition , those in which an undis-
turbed body moves over equal lengths, and the approximate
uniformity of rotation of the Earth becomes a fact of
observation. A still further change vrais made when Einstein
substituted a beam of light for an undisturbed body; the ^




tn effect, a definition of the scale for measuring time.
Tacitly adopting this scale, Eddington can say, "my personal
conclusion is that there is no more danger that the velocity
of light will change vdth time than that the circumference-
diameter ratio pi will change with time." Such a conclusion is
possible only if light defines the time-scale, but by stating
it as a "personal" conclusion, Eddington gives the impression
that it is conceivably false. The active existence of two
incompatible time scales in physics is thus clearly seen
Let us now see how the dimension^ of time are affected by
this duality. If time is measured in terms of the rotating
Earth, it is a fundamental magnitude, and if dimensions are
simply (T) , If, on the other hand, it is measured in terms
of the space covered by a moving body or by light, it is a
derived magnitude, for a change in the measurement of length
would make a change in the value of a time magnitude. The
equation (choosing light instead of an undisturbed body, for
example, and choosing 1 cm, as the distance defining the unit
of time) is i A
t « 1 }l10
whence t must have the dimensions (L) . Hence again we have
incompatible definitions yielding different dimensions; and
until we decide how time is to be measured, we cannot assign
dimensions to any magnitude derived from time.
3. Quantum Measurement
Any consideration of measurement must also include views on
quantum measurement.
Atomic events manifest themselves by their ingression
into macroscopic experience. The methods we have described
of investigating the properties of atomic systems exploit this
continuity between atomic and macroscopic events. Through the
observable effect of photons on a photographic plate and
through the observable increase in the energies of photoelect-
rons, we are able to extend the concepts of position and energy
to photons. In a sense, we perform measurements on atomic
systems when we investigate them, in this way. Now, every
measurement disturbs the system being measured. Classical
physics rests on the supposition that all measurements on a
system can be performed so gently that the disturbances they
cause are negligible. The quantization of radiant energy,
indicates, however, that there is a lower limit to the distur-
bances caused by the most gentle measurements — those employing
the interaction of light with the system. Thus, even if we
regard atomic systems as geometrical configurations, our
measurements will disturb these ^sterns in an essentially
unpredictable way. L. Menzel 36 J
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Menzel then points out that Bohr and Heisenberg demonstrated convincingly
that the indeterminacy relations could be thought of as arising from the
unpredictable nature of the disturbances incident on measurement. Also
that Von Neuman, having interpreted the mathematical formalism of quantum
mechanics in the light of the above ideas, showed that the changes in a
system resulting from a measurement on it are irreversible in the sense
of the second principle of thermodynamics. Menzel objects, in concluding,
to attributing the uncertainty solely to the measurement. He prefers
to include the very nature of the atomic order in the explajiation. He
regards the atomic order as positive and objective but, nevertheless,
we must recognize that the atomic order, because it is
formulated in terms of physical quantities, is an order that
depends on measurement. Here we use "measurement" to mean the
"methods by which we extend the meaning of physical quantities
to apply to non-macroscopic systems. [^ Menzel 36 J
Bohm (6) , commenting on an attempt to avoid the difficulty of an
unpredictable and uncontrollable transfer of a quantum in the inter-
action between observing apparatus and what is observed, by considering
the observing apparatus and what is being observed as part of a common
system, states:
The chief difficulty with the procedure outlined above
is that it yields us no information . In order to obtain
information from the system, we must interact with it some-
where, for example, by looking at the photographic plate.
and in so doing, we will have to use light Thus, wnen
we use the plate in such a way as to provide infonnation
about the position of the electron, we inevitably make the
momentum of the combined system (camera, plus plate, plus
electron) indefinite.
In all cases, one obtains information by studying the
interaction of the system of interest, which we denote here-
after by vS, with the observing apparatus, which we denote by
A. Any object whose properties are understood, even if only
in part, can in principle by utilized in the construction
of the observing apparatus. Although every observation
must be carried out by means of an interaction, the mere
fact of interaction is not, by itself, sufficient to
make possible a significant observation. The further
requirement is that, after interaction has taken place, the
state of the apparatus A must be correlated to the state
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of the aysteir S in a reproducible and reliable way. This
correlation is in general statistical, but in limiting
cases it may approach any conceivable degree of exactness
Thus, in a typical observing apparatus we obtain a correlation
such that each clearly distinguishable state of the apparatus
corresponds to a range of possible states of the system
under observation. This range may be called the uncertain!ty .
or the error, in the measurement. The possibility of ex*ror
usually arises from defects or inadequacies in design of the
apparatus that are, in principle, avoidable. In extremely
accurate measurements, however, it may arise from the quantum
nature of matter, in which case a more accurate measurement
cannot be made without changing what is observed in a funda-
mental way,
Bohm further points out that all real observations are, in their
last stages, classically describable.
We may give as an example the usual practice in science,
whereby one obtains data from meter readings, spots on a
photographic plate, clicks of a Geiger counter, etc. All
these objects and phenomena have the common property of being
classically describable, A little reflection will convince
the reader that all observations ever made in science have
employed at least one such classically describable state , . . ,
«
If the investigator wishes to study the quantian properties
of matter, he requires apparatus that amplifies the effects
of individual quanta to a classically describable level
If a sharp distinction could not be made between the observer
and the systems observed, scientific research as we know it
would not be carried out, because the observer would not
know which aspects of an observation originated in himself,
and which originate in the outside systems of interest. We
do not wish to imply, however, that scientific research is
necessarily impossible whenever an observer interacts signifi-
cantly with the things that he observes; for as long as the
observer can correct for the effects of his interactions, on
the basis of known causal laws, he can still distinguish
between effects originating in him and those originating
outside,
a Treasurement process is irreversible in the sense
that, after it has occurred, re-establishment of definite
phase relations between eigenfunctions of the measured variable
is overwhelmingly unlikely. This irreversibility greatly
resembles that which appears in thermodynamic processes,
where a decrease of entropy is also an overwhelmingly unlikely
possibility. Because the irreversible behavior of the measuring
apparatus is essential for the destruction of definite phase
relations and because, in turn, the destruction of definite
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phase relations is essential for the consistency of the
quantuB theory as a whole, it follows that thermodynamic
irreversibility enters into the quantum theory in an integral
way. This is in remarkable contrast to classical theory,
where the concept of thermodynamic irreversibility plays no
fundamental role in the basic sciences of mechanics and
electrodynamics. Thus, whereas in classical theory fundamental
variables (such as position or momentum of an elementary
particle) are regarded as having definite values independently
of whether the measuring apparatus is reversible or not, in
quantum theory we find that such a quantity can take on a
well defined value only when the system is coupled indivisibly
to a classically describable system undergoing irreversible
processes. The very definition of the state of any one system
at the microscopic level therefore requires that matter in
the large shall undergo irreversible processes, L. Bohm 6 J
Speaking within physics rather than philosophizing about
it, we use the term "measurement" very broadly. We say that
we measure the temperature of a gas, but we also say that we
measure the (average) velocity of its molecules. These are
two different things. The difference I have in mind is not
that in the first case we simply read an instinment, while
in the second we derive the numerical value from several
such readings through a fair amount of computation. The
important difference is, rather, that in the case of temperature
we measure an empirical construct, while the second mimber
receives its full meaning or interpretation only as an addi-
tional step, the coordination of, say, the classical kinetic
model to the empirical constructs and laws of thermodynamics.
Measurement (in terms of immediately observable empirical
constructs) is based on the observation of scales, and I have
never heard it suggested that we make a needle move by watching
it, which is but another way of saying that on the common
sense level of laboratory objects and their immediately
observable properties and relations, the language of common-
sense realism is the only reasonable one In measuring an
empirical construct exemplified by an object or situation A
at a given moment — or, as I shall say briefly, in measuring
A — one does not obsei*ve A alone but, rather certain aspects
of a situation (A, B) compounded of A and the yardstick or
measuring instrument B. There is thus the possibility of an
interaction by which the two components of the new situation,
A and B, may produce changes in each other. That gives rise
to two questions: (i) how can we recognize such changes?
(ii) under what conditions is a feature of (A, B) acceptable
as a measurement of A, that is, as an index or characterizer of
A alone? L Bergmann U J
'>U

The answer to the first question is self-evident. We
shall say that A has been changed by being put in the
measuring situation if it subsequently behaves in some respect
differently from A' — which is otherwise exactly like A . but
has not been meamired — provided that the difference cannot
be attributed to other factory . If the differences occur only
while (A,B) is maintained, the change may be called temporary, ,
.
.« A property of (A,B) is a measure of A if and only if it
enters, together with other such properties of A (and of other
objects), into empirical laws that predict or postdict the
behavior, before or after the occurrence of (A,B) of A (or of
A interaction with other objects) One may measure the
length of an iron rod with an ordinary yardstick to the
nearest full inch, or one may measure the same stick with a more
elaborate instrument to the nearest 0.01 in. In either case,
as in all measurement, one manipulates physical objects and,
eventually, reads a scale. The perceptual exertion required
may actually be greater in the first case than in the second.
Yet we call the second measurement more precise than the
former — or this, at least, is how I shall define 'precision.'
Precision , then, means the number of digits of a given unit .
The larger this number, the greater the precision. How precise
we can be is a matter of empirical laws and, in particular,
of those empirical laws that are sometimes referred to as the
theory of the instrument. On the other hand, a measurement
whose precision is much less than the best we can do may be
completely reliable, a measurement being called reliable when
in a large number of repetitions the result is always the same .
.....If the necessary care is taken, the first of the two
measurements of the iron rod is, in fact, completely reliable.
The second measurement which is more precise, is less likely to
be completely reliable. The values obtained will scatter or,
as one also says, their standard error will not be equal to
zero. Having thus defined precision and reliability, I turn
to a definition of accuracy . The following is , I believe
.
an exact statement of that rather fundamental feature of our
world to which we refer when we say that there is, in fact,
a limit to the accuracy of our measurements, A measurement
as precise as we can make it is never completely reliable.
Its standard error, through absolutely decreasing with increasing
precision, shows no tendency to decrease in proportion to the
last digit . Conversely, if our m.ost precise measurements were
completely reliable, we would not consider them as of limited
accuracy As is well known, we do not in careful experi-
mental work expect our measurements to be reliable. We repeat
them, define their average as the "true value" and operate in
the formulation and testing of laws with the value thus obtained.
Anybody who wishes to describe this state of affairs by saying
that all laws of nature are "statistical" is free to do ^o.
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But having made this choice of meaning, he is no longer free
to use the same term in a different ajid more specific sense
in which not all but only some empirical laws and theories
are statistical. Or, at least, he may not do so without
being explicit about it, ?\irthermore, anybody who is thus
explicit will not be tempted to believe that the inaccuracy
of measurement, by making all laws "statistical," implies or
even suggests the statistical "nature of the quantum theory."
L Bergmann, G, 4. j
The most nearly complete information obtainable about
a quantum-mechanical system is summarized in its state. But
this state is not itself the object of physical measurement.
As a matter of fact, most measurements on a system change its
state in an unpredictable fashion Bohr has taken the
attitude that the fault of classical physics lies in that it
attempts to discover physical reality in one object taken in
isolation and that, as a result, causality and reality tend
to evaporate before our eyes. He suggests that we should
consistently look at the physical object and our measuring
devices as the unit to which causality and reality must be
applied Einstein, one of the early workers in quantum
physics, has consistently held that quantum mechanics is a
temporary state of the theory, which must be overcome
ultimately by a theory that resembles classical field theory
much more closely thain it does quantum mechanics. Though
agreeing that in any observation we make, our measuring
equipment interferes with the objects we wish to observe he
feels that in our theoretical description we ought to be
able to conceive of the object B.va.rt from its interaction
with the measuring instmment, [_ Bergmann, P. G. 5 31
Bergmann then concludes with a statement of his own position:
Our physical measuring instruments consist themselves
of the same basic ingredients as the rest of the universe,
and I do not believe that the interaction between a measuring
device and the object to be measured is different in principle
from the interactions of any other physical objects. Whether
we care to read a dial or not, in other words whether we
complete the observation or let the measuring instrument
remain part of the unobserved universe, cannot affect the
behavior of the instrument. On the other hand, quantum
mechanics shows that in general we lack sufficient information
concerning the initial relationship between object and
measuring device to predict with certainty the result of the
interaction. It is possible to construct exceptions to this
general rule, however, just as in particular situations it
is possible to predict the outcome of measurements,,...
Thus it would appear that at least some aspects of the wave
function of de Broglie and Schrodingy contain the "reality"
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of a physical situation, but there remains the question whether
we can analyze more precisely the effect of a measurement on
this wave function than is usually done. My point of view
would seem to lie somewhere between those professed by Eohr and
by Einstein, but probably closer to Einstein's.
L Bergmann, P. G. 5 J
Quantum mechanics gives a very clear and unique answer
to the question as to which possible results we may expect
when we measure a certain observable, represented by an
operator with certain eigen-values. We get an equally clear
answer if we ask how great the probability of one of the
possible results will be, provided a definite "state" or wave
function is given. But there remain some questions about the
process of observation itself — questions for which we do
not get unambiguous answers because orthodox quantum mechanics
treats the concept of "measurement" as a fundamental one
which ought not to be analyzed. It is not so clear, however,
whether this attitude can be maintained without exceptions or
restrictions But while thennodynamics is essential for
the concept of observation and measurement, this aoncept
itself seems to me to be indispensable in thermodynamics and
in the notion of entropy. The relations of thermodynamics
and quantum mechanics - especially thermodynamlcal statistics
and quantum mechanics - has been the object of much discussion.
Let us mention here only the first and last stages of the
subject. (1) Paul! emphasized that even in quantum theory
there remains the necessity of an "hypothesis of elementary
disorder," which has to be acknowledged as an additional axiom
besides the "pure" quantum mechanics as formulated by the
Schrodinger equation (2) During the last years. Bom and
Green, in a series of papers, developed a fascinating account
of thermodynamical statistics based upon quantum mechanics.
Those results of their endeavour which are related intimately
to our question here may be formulated in two theses: (A)
Quantum mechanics in its full content implies irreversibility
as a necessary consequence, but (B) "pure" or "restricted"
quantum mechanics, which applies only to the Schrodinger
equation without the concepts of preparations of states,
observations, measurement or "decision^* would not do so,
Q Jordan 27 J
(Speaking on Bohr's principle of complementarity,
Oppenheimer has stated the following:)
The basic finding was that in the atomic world it is not
possible to describe the atomic system under investigation, in
abstraction from the apparatus used for the investigation, by
a single, unique, objective model. Rather, a variety of
models, each corresponding to a possible experimental arrange-
ment and all required for a complete description of possible
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physical experience, stand In a complementary relation to one
another, in that the actual realization of any one model excludes
the realization of others, yet each is a necessary part of the
complete description of experience in the atomic world,
L Oppenheimer 36 J
4., Summary I
Similarities between the communication and measurement systems
suggested by the excerpts presented are:
(a) General
1, The assumptions and rules of the scientist may be likened
to constraints,
2, Ultimately the observer obtains the information on a
sensory level,
3, Measuring apparatus between the object and the observer
correspond to modulators which operate on Inputs from the object or
phenomena, or on outputs from other modulators,
4., Since the object can contribute to a representation in
the observer, it may be considered as a source of information,
5, Modification of the output of the source tends to increase
in passing from the source to the observer through the system of apparatus,
6, Errors in measurement might be compared to noise effects.
7, The a priori and a posteriori states of the observer and
the system of apparatus and the system under investigation must be
considered in evaluating the amount of information,
8, The change in the system measured, produced by interaction






PreviouBly it has been stated that coinm"unication theory is concerned
with the problem of reproducing a representation which already exists
somewhere else emd that Scientific Information Theory is concerned with
the problem of forroulating a representation of some physical aspect of
sensory experience. In the preceding chapter, background material was
presented to suggest that the problem of formulating a representation
had many similej^ities to the problem of reli eating a representation.
It was noted that the obtaining of information by means of physical
measurement is accomplished at the expense of an overall increase
in the entropy of the system made up of phenomena of investigation,
system of apparatus, observer, and the environment. In considering
the coraraimication problem, a definition of the amount of information
was given which was suitable for a mathematical study of information
from the standpoint of selective information. Here, in the Scientific
Information System, definitions of the amount of information applicable
to the nature of this sytem will be given which are also suitable for
mathematical study. In the scientific information system, we shall b«
interested in the amount of structural information and the amoimt of
metrical information . The discussion which follows is based upon a
theory of scientific information proposed by MacKay (33, 3A). It
should be noted, however, that the result of a measurement may be
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considered from the standpoint of the amount of selective information;
this measure of the amount of information should be distinguished froin
those now discussed.
2. Structural and Metrical Information
Measures of information are the structural information content
and the metrical information content \ which is related to Fisher's
"amount of information" (20) J, The distinction between these measures
can be illustrated by considering a typical expression of the result
of a scientific measurement, "Value X corresponds to interval Y,"
Structural information is concerned with Y; metrical information is
concerned with X. In the design of experimental apparatus and procedure
the observer is enabled to formulate certain distinguishable and inde-
pendent "blank statements" or prepositional functions a priori. The
actual experiment then consists in obtaining evidence with which to
fill in the "blank statements," The problem here, then, is the
operational definition of Y and the collection of evidence for X, The
structural information content may be defined as the number of inde-
pendent prepositional functions which we are enabled by a particular
experimental method to formulate. This conld be described as the
number of logically distinguishable degrees of freedom of the repre-
M sentation. Each of the blank statements mentioned above signifies
one independent respect in which the representation could be different.
Thus, as in the case of communication aspect, information theory
proposes a more explicit method for considering problems of scientific
information by statistical and analjrtical techniques. Units are
defined for the structural information content and the metrical
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Information content — the "logon" and "metron" respectively, (Sea
Appendix). The information content of a given representation is
specified by setting down the metron content of each logon. Analysis
of the information content is facilitated by emplojrment of an
"infonnation vector space" or of matrix algebra, neither of which
will be considered here. An example will aid in understanding the
general notions of structural and metrical information content.
Suppose that it is desired to represent the voltage of a signal coming
through a channel of a certain band width, as a function of time.
At certain intervals, we wart to take "new" readings to provide "new"
ordinates for a graph. If the readings are taken too close together,
they are practically the same reading since the inertia of the system
prevents very rapid changes, Gabor has shown that in the ideal case
there is a minimal separation in time between readings, below which
(according to a certain criterion of independence) they cease to be
"practically independent." This minimal separation, A t, is related
to the band width, A f by a relation of the form
where K is a constant depending on convention, but of the order of l/2,
Thus in the time t, apparatus with a band width f enables one to
fonmilate about 2 X f X t independent propositions about the signal
amplitude. Here then is a measure of the number of labels or "blank"
statements which the experimental method provides before performing
the experiment. It is the structural information content of the
ultimate description of the signal. The metricttl information content^
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in this Instance can be measured by
where V is the voltage amplitude and N is the noise amplitude. The
variance is the square of the noise amplitude; thus the connection
vdth Fisher's "amount of information," which in the simplest case is
measured by the reciprocal of the variance of a statistical sample.
Without defining logon or matron we shall briefly discuss their
implications.
(a) Structural Information
When a chain of apparatus is involved (including the obsein^'er),
then the differentiating capacity of the least-discriminating link
determines the logon content (number of independent categories) in
the result. In many cases, structure is defined in terms of a
reference-coordinate. For example the density pattern on a photo-
graphic plate can be described by a function of one or more space-
coordinates, and the structure of a telephony signal can be specified
by a time function. The logon-capacity of an experimental method can
in such cases be defined as the niimber of logons which it specifies
per unit of coordinate-interval, or coordinate-space if several
coordinates are involved. Thus the logon-capacity of a microscope
in a particular region in the focal plane can be defined in logons/cm
,
and measures the resolving-power in that region. The logon-capacity
of a galvanometer or a communication-channel is measured in logons per
second, and represents the number of (practically) independent readings
per second which can be made with the apparatus. The logon-capacity
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of an instrument is related to its frequency bandwidth, where the
latter is defined for the general case as the effective range of input-
frequencies to which it is sensitive, by the relation
Af • AC| > K3 (5.1)
where Zi f represents the effective range of frequencies (conjugate
to a coordinate q) to which the apparatus is sensitive, A q twice the
uncertainty in q, and K a number having value about l/2.
To attempt to talk of "an interval smaller than A q" would be to
try to construct a logical pattern identical with that of "a frequency
bandwidth greater than A f" which cannot by definition appear in any
result and is therefore observationally meaningless. It is interesting
to note that the uncertainty relation of quantum mechanics
^E -At 2-. ii^
which is similar to equation (5«l) may be considered as a measure of
the absolute logon-content in Quantum Theory,
(b) Metrical Information
The quantal character of metrical information arises from the way
in which a scientific measurement is described, Q Mackay "1 A
description of a result is basically a set of instructions enabling the
reader to reproduce for himself the conceptional pattern representing
the experience of the observer. The most elementary observational
proposition asserts the existence of a coincidence-relation between two
entities. On the other hand, a magnitude is defined by saying that it
occupies a certain interval on a scale. Logically this occupance-relation
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Jbetween scale-interval and magnitude is a consequence of the existence
of coincidence-relations between the ends of the "unknown" and two
definable graduation-entities on the scale. For every observation
there is a minimum separation between neighboring graduation-entities
below which either we cannot define or cannot substantiate with
probability greater than one-half, a proposition of the form: "A
falls into \^i — B^^ and not into Bj, — Bjj ^ j^. Thus what we carrj
away from a measurement is basically an integer, the number of concep-
tually separate occupance-relations which have been specified. This
integer is concerned with the matron-content of the result. The
metron content of a result must be incapable of augmentation by
purely logical manipulation, and all complete representations of a
given result should have the same metron-content.
The quantization of scientific information according to the
definitions of structural information content and metrical information
content just discussed is amenable to mathematical analysis and hence
is an aid in the study of experiments or of a scientific information
system. A statement of the result of a scientific measurement may
be regarded as a complex of the quanta of structural and metrical
information. Thus the abstraction from scientific statements related
to measurement of a logical form which is quite general leads to a
clarification of experimentation, the role of the experimenter, and
of fundamental relations in the different fields of physical science,




Experimentation aboimds with indications that the
everyday concepts of science are not the most fundamental.
Each time that a compromise has to be struck, say, between
the sensitivity and the response-time of a galvanometer,
or the noise-level and band-width of an amplifier, or the
resolving powier and aperature of a microscope, one has an
intuitive feeling that in each case some quantity is
remaining constant behind all experimental manipulations —
something more fundamental than either of the quantities
in question. We say that Nature cannot be cheated; and
examples of this principle recur throughout the realm of
measurement, and not only in microphysics.
Is there not then a way of expressing scientific
facts so that in any context a single universal principle
can apply? Presumably in sufficiently fundamental terms
such a principle should become obvious.
It is interesting to note that the compromise which must be
accepted in a scientific measurement system is similar to the compro-
mise which must be accepted in a communication system between band
width and noise level. The latter concept has received considerable
attention in the study of communication systems by the methods of
information theory. Another compromise is apparent in the demon
problem where information is gained at the expense of increasing the
total entropy. With this in mind we shall consider the role of entropy
in Mackay's Theory of Scientific Information,
3, Entropy and Scientific Information
At this point it will be well to restate the relation between
selective information and entropy before considering the applicability
of the latter to "scientific information." Selective information
content may be Identified with the entropy of statistical mechanics in
the particular case where the ensemble from which the selection is
made is a physical one defined for a state of thermodynamic equilibrium.
In this Instance "information" will be measured in units of ergs per
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Jdegree centigrade. An alternate procedure would be to measure temperature
thermodynamically in work units so that Boltzmann's constant would take
the dimensions of a pure number related to a thermodynamic system in
equilibrium. If this is done, then both "information" and the entropy
of statistical mechanics will appear as dimensionless numbers but still
related to the thermodynamical equilibrium ensemble in question. When-
ever we are discussing thermodynamic entropy by the methods of statis-
tical mechanics, we must keep in mind that in order to study the
properties of a thermodynamic system , whose condition is described by
the values of a limited number of thermodynamic variables, we must
consider the average properties of an appropriately chosen representative
ensemble of systems, of similar constitution to the one of actual
interest. In a general way it may be said that the appropriate choice
of representative ensemble depends on taking a distribution of the
members of the ensemble over their possible individual states, which
agrees, on the one hand, with our knowledge of the thermodynamic
variables that have been measured, and which conforms, on the other
hand, with the hypothesis of equal a priori probabilities and of
random a priori phases on which the deductions of statistical results
have been based. The condition of thermodynamic equilibrium for the
systems of usual thermodynamic interest can best be represented by a
canonical ensemble * since this has been found to give the most appro-
priate description of equilibrium in the case of systems in thermal
contact with their surroimdings or in essential rather than perfect
Isolation therefrom. Hence for "information" (selective) to be
identified with physical entropy its ensemble must be limited in a
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like manner. Frequently the mathematical form
—^ p- £oQ P:
(the entropy of a probability distribution) which is a pure number and
which appears in the H-theorems and in statistical mechanics, has been
labeled "entropy," If entropy is considered to be defined by this
expression, then it is readily identified with selective information.
But even here this form is related to an ensemble with certain con-
straints and with definite properties. Thus one should determine the
nature of the system and the ensemble in question before identifying
selective information content with the statistical mechanical analogue
of thermodynamic entropy.
With regard to "scientific information," Mackay states that the
roetron-content of a measurement and the entropy are equivalent quanti-
ties, both having quantal aspects, and a change in one being opposite
in sign to the change in the other. Thus in a physics which started
from the concept of Information as one of its basic quantities, the
sum Entropy-plus-Information content would rank as a fundamental
invariant,
A system whereby a representation is defined by a selection
process is termed a code system . The corresponding representation of
the selection process transmitted Is known as a code signal . As a
physical sequence the code 'signal itself will have metrical and
structural features and will be definable by a vector in an information
space. BUT ITS STRUCTURE NEED NOT HAVE ANYTHING IN COMMON WITH THAT
OF THE REPRESENTATION WHICH IT IDENTIFIES (the tip of the information
vector occupies one of a number of cells into which the information
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space Is divided or aunnf-J^^^ +uq a tized, the ease with which one of the.e possible
positions is selecfpf^ hv +k« j
^ *'' '^"^''^'- "««^ ""t be dependent upon how
the information vector was built nr, >^r ^O up by logon and matron contents).
However, the ordinary case of making nh^ ^ nphysical representations in
S=ienti.io Xnfo^ation Theo... Mao.a. (33) o.Xd
.e thought or
.on.!.,
^s a speoia. ease o. eodi„„ one.o.one. ^s the
.suU o. an e=.el
nient, as well as a communication signal coi:l^ v^^^^ ''''''^^ ^ analyzed in terms ofits selective information content. This is a rel«f^t iiix IS ative measure,
depending on the number of dls+ino-f.istinct results which were regarded as
equally probable by the observer, l^e result h
.
in observed is thought of
2
-ci^n. one o. a ^he. o. p^esiMiities ai.ead. contemplated h.
- . „
..in. an ense„.e in defined p.^.tions.
.e amounto.
-electi. info^ation derived f.„„ the e.pe.i.ent oan then . _puted in the same wav as rnr. «'
' " "'''''' "''"f-e. it is apparent
at the info..tion content of an e.pe.i„ent can he dete^ined f.„
e selecti.. o. f.o. the st.ctu.l and
.ethical viewpoints, o.
.th.
or unexpected is it?" or "How big i. if" „ .nV o s t. or "How much detail has it?"
Again it should be emphasized that regardless of which view-
^-
is Chosen to measure the information content of an experiment,
that the selective information content n, k .."^""^^"^
"^y be Identified with the




- Physical one definedfor a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. If ,11 „ ,, ,, _
„„,. ,
'' ""-^ I! distinguishable
voltage-levels of a transmitted signal are r». . .
.^ ,
^^^ ^^ egarded as equlprobable.
the selective information content per logon 1« . .,is proporUonal to log 1;.
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On the other hand, the physical entropy Increase is proportional to or
must exceed n^. Here the correlation is between metrical information
content and physical entropy increase, Metron content can be thought
of here as the number of unit increases of physical entropy — i.e.,
of elementary events — which have been subsumed under one head,
thereby losing their distinguishability and potentiality of serving
as "bits." Under optimum conditions, the energy change is a minimum ;
and this, in general, is proportional to the amount of metrical
information.
(a) Example Problem
On the basis of material presented in this and previous chapters,
and in order to show the significance of some of the ideas proposed,
the following simple empirical problem is presented. Although not
practical in itself, the situation is devised to illustrate how an
experimenter m.ight apply concepts of information theory to explain
measurement phenomena.
The materials used, statement of the problem, and requirements
are as follows:
(a) Materials used:
(1) Two large baths containing equal volumes of ice and
water in equilibrium, both volumes having been drawn
from the same initial container. The two baths are
insulated such that both volumes will remain at
identical temperature if allowed to continue isolated
from the exterior.
(2) Two small baths containing minute though equal quantities
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of ice and water in equilibrium drawn from the same
initial container used in (1) . Further restrictions
are exactly as stated in (l),
(3) One high heat capacity thermometer at room temperature
(25 Degrees C) with bulb of such dimensions as to be
small enough to be adequately covered if inserted in
small volume described in (2),
(b) Statement of the problem — measure with above thermometer
one each of volumes (l) and (2),
(c) Requirements — report temperatures obtained and if not
identical or reasonably close, determine which is correct
and why.
We will assume that the experimenter's starting point is one of
the small volumes, and that he does not know that the temperature
should be vei^' close to degrees Centigrade depending upon the accuracy
of the thermometer.
The experimenter, striving for accuracy, makes several measure-
ments of the small volume and attains readings ranging from 6 to 10
degrees with the mean at 9 degrees Centigrade. Knowing beforehand
that all volumes came from the same initial source, and that therefore
the large and small volumes should have approximately the same tempera-
ture distribution, our experimenter turns to one of the large volumes.
On the basis of his measurements just completed and the previous
statement, he forms a mental picture or representation of what the
results should be for hie next run, a priori assigning probabilities
for specific readings. However, upon making his measurements, he
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finds that the readings from the large bath all range in the vicinity
of degrees Centigrade. Since these indications fall on the border
or even outside his proposed pattern, his first conclusion might be
that he has received a large amount of information.
Yet, because of the discrepancy, that conclusion does not quite
satisfy him. According to information theory as applied to physical
systems, there should be a large entropy change accompanying a receipt
of much information from a measurement process. The experimenter, upon
turning his attention to the large and small vats which were unmeasured,
notices no visual change if he compares large volumes. However, the
comparison of small volumes does indicate differences. The ice content
of the one whose temperature was measured seems to be less than that
of the alternate one. He believes it possible then that there might
have been an interaction between his measuring instrument and the
measured small volume, and that, as a consequence the results attained
therefrom portray an erroneous picture. Since this picture was applied
to give a priori probabilities to his representation of the large
volume, it could be the reason why he seemed to get so much information
from the large volume when there was no apparent change in the bath.
The experimenter's original picture, in that case, should have been a
close approximation to the final results, and, therefore, little
information ought to have been received. He decides that the results
for the large bath are more nearly correct.
The initial measurement of the small system was undertaken with
no representation in mind. If the experimenter considers that system
again, the above results gained from the large bath then should determine
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his a priori pattern of the small system. Since the indications of
the measuring instrument diverged to some degree from this pattern,
and the "source of information" was disturbed, the experimenter really
received much "information" from, the small system. However, this he
cannot consider as "good information," rather he now knows that he
was deceived by the receipt of misinformation in a form, of distortion
noise introduced by interaction between the measuring device and the
bath. If he now selects a thermometer of small enough dimensions such
that the bulb contacts only a slight amount of the mixj-ure, he can
approach more closely the distribution attained by the measurement of
the large volume completed above and deemed correct.
The foregoing approach to this problem has been based solely on
the observer's forming a representation based on preconceived possi-
bilities. His results then are all in the realm of selective information.
Earlier in Chapter V, reference was made and explanation proposed with
regard to another means of attacking the problem of measurement. This
means is concerned with "logon content" or structural information
content and "metron content" or m.etrical information content. What
results are yielded by the application of these concepts to the above
example?
The experimenter here is concerned with only a single logon, that
of temperature. This is true because fluctuations can arise from only
two sources: (a) those due to the random collisions of the molecules
with the thermometer, and (b) those arising as a result of the gradual
change over a long period of time of the system. The former are of
such rapidity that they are unobservable in any given temperature
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reading because of the design of the Instrument. Upon observing
equation (5.C), it can be seen that for the usual time required to
take a temperature reading the latter fluctuations vrill not affect
the results because of their low frequency.
In the absence of information as to the temperature, the experi-
menter might assume all temperatures measurable with his device to be
equally probable. If in measuring the small volume the experimenter
takes several readings, and between readings allows the therrometer to
return to its initial state, his results will show a decided spread.
The variance given by (S' will then be of considerable magnitude.
Since metrical information content is related to the reciprocal of the
variance through Fisher's measure, this quantity will be low.
On the other hand, similar measurement of the large volume will
yield results all of which shoitld be of nearly the same magnitude, thus
having little spread, and the metrical information content will be high.
If he considers the signal to noise ratio, with the understanding
that the variance is the square of the noise amplitude, the cause of the
discrepancy arising between the measurements of the two systems becomes
clearer. The small volume results having a larger variance must someway
have been subject to quite a large amount of noise. The large volume
results do not show having had the same effect introduced. Thus, since
the metrical information content is higher for the large volume, the
experimenter can have, in effect, more confidence in his results obtained
there
.
Thus by the application of two different concepts of "information,"
that of selective information and that of metrical infonnation, the
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observer has been able to determine unforeseen difficulties arising
when he operated on the system in order to learn one of its gross char-
acteristics.
k. Efficiency Deterrcination by Information Theory
In considering entropy and scientific measurement or experimenta-
tion, Brlllouin analyzed "observations" in terms of the Selective
information gain and the physical entropy cost of the "observation,"
The relation involved is expressed in terms of the efficiency of the
experiment
£ =- ^l//\ S, £ J (5.2)
This physical entropy cost corresponds vdth the metrical information
content which has been identified with the minimum physical entropy
change produced by the measurement itself under optimum conditions.
Szilard's demonstration of the validity of the second principle despite
the operation of Maxwell's demon* in a system has Indicated a generalized
statement of the second principle for any process in which physical
measurement is involved of the form
Zi (>::
e;
- 1 j r: O ^ where (5.3)
S a initial physical entropy I = selective information
Thus a measurement in which the selective information gain was low
relative to the metrical information content would be one of low
efficiency. The entropy increase introduced by the measurement is
related to the monetary cost of conducting the experiment and to
* See Chapter IV, Introduction.

subsequent measiireinent of properties of the higher entropy system. Thus
it is worthwhile to consider whether or not the selective information
gain is compatible with these factors and to make optimum use of the
system and techniques available to increase efficiency.
After a consideration of a number of examples, Brillouin (13)
concludes that for measurements of high accuracy, the efficiency
according to the above definition could be low; if extremely small
distances had to be measured, the efficiency of the observation could
drop to 10 , Thus he states:
The physicist operating in a given laboratory disposes
of a limited supply of negentropy, which results in a limit
to the small distances he can actually measure The
conclusion is that there is no precise limitation to the
small distances that can be measured but that the entropy
cost increases enormously when distances become really small,
C Brillouin 13 3
5. Further Applications
In addition to the application of information theory in determining
the efficiency of a measurement, there are other conclusions which the
theory of scientific information theory offers and which are stated
without further qualification. [^ Mackay 33, 3^^ H
a) The various uncertainity relations of physics appear basically as
axioms expressing the quantal nature of communicable information,
consequent to the use of logical forms.
b) An experiment is not giving full information unless the metron-
content of the observation (reading of a pointer) exceeds that of the
measurement (characterized by apparatus, technique, and a priori
structurization)
.
c) Performance of an experiment results fundamentally in the collection,
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and allocation to the various logons, of the metron-flow arising from
the impact of data on the apparatus plus observer,
d) In the statistical matching of one part of an experiment to another
if a weak link in a sequence is knovn to yield only a certain metron
content Iq, it is possible to estimate the time sind/or space which it
is worth-while to devote to each of the remaining links, and to gain
in overall-metron-content per unit of space-time by designing these
links so as to barter accuracy for speed or compactness,
e) If the total metrical information provided by a given technique is
not usefully employed and is greater than the logon content, then to
increase the selective information content it is more profitable to
increase the logon content than the metron content,
f) In experiments to determine a constant, efforts should be directed
toward "logon-compression" — reducing the frequency response of the
apparatus, with respect to time and space. In short, best results are
obtained by acting consistently with one's belief that the constant
will not alter with time or position, so that one logon will be sufficient,
g) In a sequence of operations, the logon-capacity of each should be
adjusted so that the metron-content does not greatly exceed the value
which it has in the stage with the narrowest bandwidth. This will
enable each subsidiary operation to occupy the minimum space and time,
so giving a higher overall m.etron-capacity, and making possible more
repetitions of the experiment in a given space-time tract,
h) VJith a given input of energy, there is almost always an improvement
In resolving power (structural detail) when intelligent steps are taken
to sacrifice metrical information,
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i) An increase in the matron-content of individual logons can be
bought at the expense of logon-capacity, but the limit is set by the
total metron content, which depends on the expanse of coordinate
tract devoted to the experiment.
6. Parallelism between Corainunication Theory and Scientific Information
Theory
Having now considered in a general way the applicability of infor-
mation theory to scientific measurement and procedure, it will be
appropriate to suggest a parallelism between features of a communication
system between individuals and an information linkage in scientific
measurement. Admittedly there are differences j the primary one being,
as pointed out previously, that the goal of the communication system
is replication and the goal of the scientific information linkage is
formulation
. In both instances a productive analysis necessitates
including the source of information and the receiver of information in
the system. In both, the a priori and a posteriori probabilities are
factors to be considered. In both, the possibility of characterizing
as many aspects of the system components as possible in mathematical
terms augments the techniques whereby input, output and efficiency may
be studied. On the following page, items in the left hand column are
applicable to a general commimication system. Analogous features of a
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alternate methods of experimental
investigation)
compromise
(metron content, logon content)
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7. Summarization of Aims of Information Theory
Having examined and compared two applications of Information Theory,
we may summarize its aims as follows:
a) to isolate from their particular contexts those abstract features
of representations which can remain invarient under reformulation,
b) to treat quantitatively the abstract features of processes by which
representations are made.
c) to give quantitative meanings to the several senses in which the notion
of amount of information can be used.
With regard to scientific information theory, the realization of
these aims embodies the consideration of all those factors which contri-
bute to the formulation of the representation by the investigator, i.e.,
apparatus, scales of measttrement, dimensions of measurement, the coupling
of various components of the information system, extrapolation from one
space-time scale of observation to another, errors, and the operations
of the investigator pertinent to formulation of models, of scientific
description, and the constraints of nature, flichards, speaking on the
subject of language, has in a general way expressed the need to consider
all the components of a system as far as possible.
The very instruments we use, if we try to say something
which is not trivial about any aspect of language, embody in
themselves the problems we hope to use them to explore All
studies suffer from, and thrive through, this: that the properties
of the instruments or apparatus employed enter into, contribute
to, belong with, and confine the scope of the investigation
I conjecture and I speak very humbly here — that mathematics
may have been the earliest study forced to ask itself about its
own intellectual viewpoint, and the influence of its symbolism
on its scope. This may suggest that the more abstract the properties
of the instruments, the easier it may be to take account of their
presence and not overlook them Q Richards 4^3 J
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We have noted some of the applications and considerations of f
information theory; it has been emphasized that the potential elegance
of the latter is rooted in sharpened definitions of the basic features
of connnunication channels, which definitions are essential to a mathe-
matical description of those features. However, the prospect of a more
precise method of investigation should not cause one to overlook
inherent limitations in the method of attack. In this regard the
remarks of Fano (l8) may well be heeded.
One should also avoid confusing a physical system with the
mathematical model which is used to represent it. The same
physical system may be represented by different theoretical
models I depending upon the problem under consideration. For
instance, a computing machine may well be considered as a
communication channel when certain aspects of its behavior are
of interest, or as a perfectly determinate transducer when
other aspects are the relevant ones. The fact is that we can
never represent completely any physical system by means of a
mathematical model because we cannot conceive of a model
sufficiently complex; and even if we could conceive of it, it




The concept of entropy was considered in thennodynamics and in
statistical mechanics as an aid to understanding the relationship of
entropy and an amount of information. It was noted that the entropy of
statistical mechanics and thermodynamic entropy were not Identical in
nature if the absolute validity of the second principle is assumed,
A definition of the amount of information received in a message
was given: Pea j
It was demonstrated that this formula could be applied to events or to
messages in a discrete communication system with or without noise.
Different interpretations of "information" were brought forth, and it
was seen that the more comprehensive analysis of Mackay resolved
ambiguities. This analysis measures the amount of information In a
message received according to its statistical rarity, and designates
the result as the amount of selective information.
We then considered several problems in which "information" behaved,
analyi^ically speaking, as the negative of entropy. Despite the fact
that this result appeared to agree with rough Intuitive Ideas In which
entroRT is deemed to be a type of "missing information," It was pointed
out that "information" could be identified with the negative of physical
entropy only in properly qualified systems . However, "selective
information" could be Identified with the non-thermodynamlcal fonn of
entropy or the entropy of a set of probability distributions.
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Information theory in its most general form embodied methods which
were not necessarily limited to treatment of communication between
individuals. If the communication application of information theory
by its quantization and definition, in a manner susceptible to mathema-
tical analysis, offered more elegant and productive methods of solving
"communication" problems, could not similar methods be applied to other
fields of endeavor which involve a transfer of information? Since one
of the most important of the latter is the field of "Scientific Informa-
tion" as it arises from experimentation on physical systems, it was
deemed advantageous to recount various viewpoints on the problem of
measurement in general. Although differences in these were apparent,
it was proposed that, most generally, scientific measurement and
formulation deal with an observer extracting information from a space-
time tract by interaction and analysis.
To deal effectively with scientific measurement, information
theory defines underlying phenomena in terms suitable for analytical
and statistical treatment. The means whereby Scientific information
theory "quantizes" scientific information was described in detail and
was seen to be based upon the concepts of structural information and
metrical information. These concepts in terms of logon and metron
content make possible the assessment of the total information content
for a given apparatus and technique, practical conclusions as to which
factor (metron or logon) should be emphasized to gain specific results,
and appreciation of the entropy cost for accuracy. The application of
infomiation theory to scientific measurement demonstrates that there
are definitely aspects therein which parallel the communication problem —
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I.e., the a priori and a posteriori representation; that in a measurement
the various components should be compatible in discrimination and statis-
tical nature for optimal efficiency in the same way that components of
a communication system must be matched in their statistical features,
and compatible in their characteristics for the maximum transfer of
information within a given system.
There are two aspects of information theory which have been
purposely omitted and yet which may be confounded with what has been
set forth in this paper. In speaking of scientific information theory,
no reference was made to physical reality t regarding "information^' no
reference was made to the utility for an individual of information
received. Neither of these aspects are amenable to the techniques




Baker, H. D., E. A. Ryder,
and N. H, Baker
2. Barnard, G, D.
3. Bell, D. A.
4.. Bergmann, Gustav
5. Bergmann, P. G.
6. Bohm, David
7. Bridgman, P. W.
8, Brldgman, P. W.




Engineering . New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1953
"The Theory of Informationy
Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society . Series B, XIII No. 1,
1951, 46-6ii
Information Theory and its
Engineering Applications
.
London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons,
1953
"The Logic of Quanta," Americsm
Journal of Physics . 15, 1947,
397-^08
Basic Theories of Physics . New
York: Prentice-Hall, 1951
Quantum Theory . New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1951
The Nature of THERMODYNAMICS .
Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 194-3
Reflections of a Physicist .
New York: Philosophical Library,
1950
The Nature of Some of our Physical
Concepts . New York: Philosophical
Library, 1952
"Life, Thermodynamics, and
Cybernetics," American Scientist *
37, 1959, 554-568
"Maxwell's Demon Cannot Operate:
Information and Entropy. I.,"




12. Brill ouin, L.
13. Brillotdn, L.
H. Corben, R. C, and
P. Stehle
15. Degroot, S. R.
16. Dingle, Herbert
17. Eddington, A. S.
18. Fano, R. M.
19. Finck, J. L.
20. Fisher, R. A.
21. Gabor, D.
22. Gibbs, J. W.
23. Goldinan, Stanford
24. Good, I. J.
"Physical Entropy and Information,
II.," Journal of Apr^lied Physics .
22, 1951, 338-343
"The Negentropy Principle of
Information," Journal of Applied
Physics
. 24, 1953, 1152-1163
Classical Mechanics . New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1950
Thermodynar.i cs of Irreversible
Processes . New York: Inter-
science Publishers, 1951
"On the Dimensions of Physical
Magnitudes," Philosophic Magazip^
.
Series VII, Vol. 33, 1942, 321-344
The Nature of the Physical World.
New York: The Macmillan Company,
1929
Communication Theory . Edited by
Willis Jackson, New York: Academic
Press, 1953, 484





The Design of Experiments . Fourth
Edition, New York: Fiafner-Publishing
Company, 1947
"A Summary of Communication Theory,"
Communication Theory . Edited by
Willis Jackson, New York: Academic
Press, 1953, 1-23
THE COLLECTED WORKS of Jj. Willard
Gibbs. Volume I, Thermodynamics,
New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1928
Information Theory . New "^orkj
Prentice-Hall, 1953
Probability and the Weighing of





26, Hercus, E. 0,
27, Jordan, P,
28. Kantor, J. R,
29. Kennard, E. H.
30. Klein, J. F.
31. Lindsay, R. B.
32. Lindsay, R. B.
33. Mackay, D. M.
f 3/,, Mackay, D. M.
/
// 35. Margenau, Henry
36. Menzel, D. H, and
David Layzer
37, Muses, C, A.
Philosophic Problems of >?uclear
Science . New York: Pantheon,
1952





"On the Process of Measurement in
Quantum Mechanics," Philosophy of
Science . 16, 19A9, 269-278
The LoRic of Modern Science
.
Bloomington, Indiana; Evans ton,
Illinois: The Princlpia Press,
1953
Kinetic Theory of Gases . New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1938
Physical Significance of Entropy .
New York: D. Van Nostrand Company,
1910
Introduction to Physical Statistics .
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1941
Concepts and Methods of Theoretical
Physics . New York: D, Van Nostrand
Company, 1951




"In Search of Basic Symbols,"




Heinz von Foerster, Caldwell, N. J.J
Progress Associates, 1952
The Nature of Physical Reality .
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950
"The Physical Principles of the
Quantum Theory," Philosophy of
Science. 16, 1949, 3C3-324
An Evaluation pf Relativity Theory .





/^C, Raymond, R. C.
41 • Raymond, R. C,
42. Reichenbach, Hans
4.3. Richards, I. A,
4i. Schrodinger, Erwin
4-5. Sears, F. W,
46. Shannon, C. E.
47. Smith, R. A.
48. Stevens,
49. Tolman, R. C.
"The Age of Science," Scientific
American . Sept. 1950, 20-23
Treatise on Thermodynamics . Third
Edition, London: Longmans, Green
& Company, 1927




"Well Informed Heat Engine,"
American Journal of Physics . 19>
1951, 109-112
Philosophic Foundations of Quantum
Mechanics
.
Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1946
"Communication between Men: The
Meaning of Language," Cybernetics
Transactions of the Eighth
Conference . Edited by Heinz




Cambridge: University Press, 1948
An Introduction to Thermodynamics
.
The Kinetic Theory of Oases , and




"A Mathematical Theory ^f Communi-
cation," The Bell System Technical
Journal
. 27, 1948, 379-423,
623-656
The Physical Principles of
Thermodynamics . London: Chapman
& Hall, 1952
"On the Theory of Scales of
Measurement," Science
. 34, 1946







5C, von Bertalanffy, Ludwig
51. Watanabe, M. S.
52. Wiener, Norbert
53. Wilson, W.
5^. Whittaker, E. T,
55. Woodward, P. M.
"The Theory of Open Systems in
Physics and Biology," Science
.
3, 1950, 23-29
"A Study of Ergodicity and
Redundancy Based on Intersymbol
Correlation of Finite Range."
U. S. Naval Post-Graduate School:
195-^
Cybernetics . New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 19i^
"Dimensions of Physical Quantities,"
Philosophical Magazine . Seventh
Series, Vol. 33, 19^, 26-33
"Some Disputed Questions in the
Philosophy of Physical Sciences,"
Philosophical Magazine . Seventh
Series, Vol. 33, 1942, 353-366
Probability and Information
Theory , with Applications to Radar .





1. Repreeentation — a representation is any structure (pattern,
picture, model), whether abstract or concrete, of which the
features purpost to symbolize or correspond in some sense with
those of some other structure.
2. Structural Information Content — this quantity is defined as the
number of distinguishable groups or clusters in a representation -
the number of definably independent respects in which it could
vary — its dimensionality or number of degrees of freedom or
basal multiplicity .
3. Logon — the unit of structural information, one logon . is that
which enables one such new distinguishable group to be defined
for a representation.
4.. Logon Content — this is a convenient texTn for the structural
information content or number of logons (number of independently
variable features) in a representation (e.g., the number of
independent coefficients required to specify a given wave form
over a given period of time),
5. Metrical Information Content — the definition of this term is:
the number of (indistinguishable) logical elements in a given
group or in the total pattern,
6, Metron -- the unit of metrical information, one metron, is
defined as that which supplies one element for a pattern. Each
eg

element may be considered to represent one unit of evidence.
Thus the amoimt of metrical information in a pattern measures the
weight of evidence to which it is equivalent. Metrical information
gives a pattern its weight or density — the "stuff" out of which
the "structure" is formed,
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